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ABSTRACT 
 
There has been growing global attention to Universal Health Coverage (UHC) and countries 
across the world have placed achievement of UHC amongst their top policy priorities. UHC is 
defined as ensuring that all citizens can access relevant health services whenever they need 
care in a manner that ensures they are not exposed to financial hardship. Health financing 
systems are critical to achieving UHC- one of the building blocks of a health system, health 
financing is concerned with the mobilization, accumulation and allocation of funds to cover 
the needs of a population. The purpose of a health financing system is to make funding 
available, set the right incentives to health care providers and to ensure all individuals have 
access to effective public and personal health services. A health financing system has three 
inter related functions; revenue collection, pooling and purchasing which all need to work 
together for achievement of UHC. 
Purchasing is defined as the allocation of pooled funds to providers in exchange for medical 
services. Purchasing can be passive (whereby purchasers simply pay bills presented by 
providers) or strategic (whereby purchasers continuously apply evidenced based decisions 
and processes when allocating funds to providers to maximize value). Many countries aiming 
to achieve UHC have prioritized shifting from passive to strategic purchasing as part of their 
health financing system reforms. Literature shows evidence that implementation of strategic 
purchasing can contribute to achieving UHC by: aligning funding and incentives with promised 
health services to promote access; linking transfer of funds to providers to performance with 
the goal of promoting quality in service delivery; and enhancing equity in resource 
distribution. Implementation of strategic purchasing mechanisms is however not a straight 
forward process as providers can use various sources of power such as: monopoly and 
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bargaining capacity; some provider payment mechanisms such as fee-for-service; and 
information asymmetry to resist the adoption of strategic purchasing mechanisms. Providers 
are likely to resist implementations of those mechanisms that they perceive will shift too 
much of the risk of providing care to them or will erode their economic gains. Purchasers also 
have sources of power they can use to influence implementation such as: institutional 
regulatory authority; monopsony and bargaining authority; and some provider payment 
mechanisms such as capitation. Power in this study is defined as a relation between two 
parties whereby party A is said to have power over party B to the extent that A can get B to 
do something that B would not have otherwise done. 
Kenya has in the past decade formulated and implemented various policies towards achieving 
UHC, including reforming some of its purchasing functions. An example is the introduction of 
capitation (a provider payment mechanism) for private providers, by the public purchaser- 
National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF). Private purchasers have, as part of strategic 
purchasing, intervened in clinical decision-making processes amongst private providers as a 
way of managing costs and improving quality. Existing literature shows public and private 
purchasers in Kenya are faced with multiple challenges when implementing strategic 
purchasing mechanisms such as lack of technical expertise, poor planning and resistance from 
some providers. 
This study explored the implementation of strategic purchasing mechanisms by NHIF and 
private purchasers amongst private providers in Kenya to understand the role of various 
sources of power in influencing implementation outcomes (acceptability and adoption) in 
order to contribute to work on how to implement strategic purchasing. Private providers in 
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Kenya play a significant role in provision of care and over 40% of facilities in Kenya are 
privately owned. 
We employed a multiple case study design. The first case focused on implementation of 
capitation by the public purchaser NHIF. The second case focused on the implementation of 
select strategic purchasing mechanisms by private purchasers including intervening in clinical 
decision-making processes, use of preauthorization and use of specialists for second opinions 
amongst others. In total eight interviews were completed and eighteen documents (including 
newspapers articles, documents from websites, and provider-purchaser contracts) were 
included as data sources. Each case was analysed individually using thematic analysis, after 
which a cross case analysis was completed. 
Our findings show that in the first case of the NHIF purchaser, NHIF used its regulatory 
authority to gazette and hence dictate the capitation rate to providers. NHIF also used its 
monopsony to convince providers that there would be significant economic gains from the 
capitation model as NHIF had a huge number of beneficiaries. However, some of the large 
providers used their monopoly and bargaining capacity to walk away from the scheme as they 
still commanded significant market share even without the NHIF capitation business as they 
felt the proposed capitation rate was too low. In the second case, private purchasers used 
contracts as a source of power to give them some authority to control prices of services and 
ensure providers adhered to strategic purchasing mechanisms such as use of preauthorization 
processes. Some private providers on the other hand used various sources of power to resist 
implementation such as information asymmetry to by-pass some of the documentation 
requirements set by the private purchasers. Some providers also used monopoly and fee-for- 
service payment mechanisms to dictate prices of services to purchasers. Some private 
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providers did however willingly adopt some of the strategic purchasing mechanisms namely: 
preauthorization processes and use of step-down facilities as they felt these minimized the 
risk of unpaid claims. Across the two cases, NHIF seemed to have had relatively more power 
over providers compared to private purchasers. For example, NHIF gazetted the capitation 
rates and did not revise them despite strong opposition from some of the large private 
providers, whilst private purchasers complained that some of the large private providers 
always had their way by dictating prices of their services to the private purchasers. 
Whilst there have been a growing number of recent studies touching on strategic purchasing 
in Kenya, few of them have focused on the role of power and/or implementation of strategic 
purchasing in Kenya. This study focused on how various sources of power for providers and 
purchasers can affect implementation of strategic purchasing in order to provide insight into 
the implementation of strategic purchasing mechanisms. The study found that private 
providers can use their various sources of power to resist adoption of strategic purchasing 
mechanisms they do not deem acceptable; some mechanism are however deemed 
acceptable and are willingly adopted. The study also highlights that purchasers can use their 
sources of power to influence adoption of strategic purchasing amongst providers. The study 
hopes to provide insight to policy makers and purchasers on the need to consider the role of 
power when implementing strategic purchasing mechanisms and to plan accordingly. One 
general lesson on implementation includes the importance of early communication and 
dialogue when implementing strategic purchasing mechanisms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Health financing as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) is the ‘’function of a health system that 
is concerned with mobilization, accumulation and allocation of money to cover the health needs of the 
people’’ whereby the purpose of health financing is ‘’to make funding available as well as to set the right 
financial incentives to providers to ensure that all individuals have access to effective public health and 
personal health care’’ (WHO 2000). Health financing systems have three key functions as follows: (1) revenue 
collection-mechanisms by which health systems receive funds from households, organizations/companies 
or donors; (2) pooling-accumulation and management of collected funds to ensure that the financial risk of 
seeking health care is shared by all members of a given pool; and (3) purchasing-the process through which 
the pooled monies are paid to providers in exchange of a set of health interventions (WHO 2000). Health 
financing systems thus play a critical role in determining the ability of a country’s domestic health system to 
not only provide health services to her people but also ensure maximum health gains are achieved through 
efficient use of the limited resources available. Many low- and middle-income countries, including those in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are home to a large share of the global disease burden and are struggling to improve the 
efficiency of their health financing systems as they strive to actualize the goals of Universal Health Coverage 
(UHC) (World Bank Group 2018). The goals of UHC include providing financial protection from costs of 
seeking health care and providing access to quality health care for all when in need. Kenya, a low middle 
income (Barasa, Maina & Ravishanka 2017) country with poor health outcomes, limited resources and poor 
progress to achieving UHC, has a similarly weak health financing system that is also faced by numerous 
challenges and inefficiencies in resource optimization (Luoma et al. 2010) that must be addressed prior to 
achieving UHC. 
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The 2010 World Health Report (WHO 2010) notes that one of the fundamental questions that countries 
striving for UHC need to address is how to encourage optimum use of available resources; this is even more 
so critical in low middle income nations such as Kenya with relatively fewer economic resources at their 
disposal. The 2010 World Health Report further notes that countries can significantly increase their 
efficiency and quality of care by shifting away from passive forms of purchasing to more active (strategic) 
forms (WHO 2010); highlighting the significance of the purchasing function within health financing systems. 
Passive purchasing is where purchasers simply transfer resources to providers through mere financial 
reimbursements in response to bills received for services rendered, whilst strategic purchasing involves 
greater considerations of the following: which interventions to purchase, how to purchase them and from 
whom to purchase the interventions (WHO 2010). Strategic purchasing is said to occur when purchasers link 
resource allocation decisions to provider performance (Kutzin 2001) and is implemented through a range of 
tools including: regulation, contract negotiation, quality rating of health plans, performance incentives and 
consumer education (DuGoff, Weiner 2011). One of the main ways strategic purchasing mechanisms aid in 
increasing efficiency and improving care is by enabling purchasers to use their power to influence provider 
actions and behaviours (Kutzin 2001). Various conceptualizations of ‘power’ exist within literature with the 
most relevant ones to this study being those that discuss power in terms of a relation between two parties. 
Dahl (1957) outlines that ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would 
otherwise not do’’. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) add that power can also be a matter of A preventing B from 
doing what B wants to do. Power is a relational concept and is activated between two parties, the 
relationships between purchasers and providers in the process of implementing strategic purchasing 
mechanisms will thus give rise to opportunities to express power. 
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For purchasers and providers, some of the sources of power that they use to influence the actions of the 
other to their advantage or to promote/protect their interests and objectives include market power such as 
monopolies and monopsonies that enable either of the two to dictate prices or terms that are favourable to 
them (Pauly 1998). Other sources of power specific to purchasers include: use of their pooled financial 
resources to actively demand quality and efficiency from providers by linking resource allocation to 
performance or through creating financial incentives for improved quality (Kutzin 2001); use of innovative 
provider payment mechanisms and arrangements as sources of contractual power to shift some of the 
financial risk of providing care to providers (Kutzin 2001); and use of regulatory authority and legislature by 
government purchasers to dictate terms for providers (DuGoff, Weiner 2011) amongst others. Information 
asymmetry, a characteristic of the health care market is also a source of power which is frequently used by 
providers to promote their own interests (Kutzin 2001). 
Public and private purchasers in Kenya have over the past few years implemented a range of strategic 
purchasing mechanisms in private provider facilities. Recognizing the pivotal role strategic purchasing has in 
ensuring optimal use of healthcare resources (WHO 2010) this study, through an implementation lens, will 
focus on the implementation of various strategic purchasing mechanisms as follows: (1) use of a capitation 
model by the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) to manage its outpatient health insurance plan and 
(2) implementation of select strategic purchasing mechanisms by private purchasers including intervening 
in clinical decision-making processes, hiring of staff with medical backgrounds, selective contracting of 
providers, use of preauthorization processes and use of step-down procedures (Munge et al., 2015, Deloitte, 
2011). 
Capitation involves a fixed payment per beneficiary to providers contracted by a healthcare purchaser to deliver 
a range of services to a given population which potentially offers great incentives for prevention and cost control 
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(WHO 2000). Capitation symbolizes a huge and significant shift in NHIF’s purchasing strategy of moving from 
passive to strategic purchasing whilst the select strategic purchasing mechanisms for private purchasers were 
identified from existing literature outlining efforts by private purchasers to implement strategic purchasing in 
order to control costs and as quality assurance strategies (Munge et al., 2015, Deloitte, 2011). As strategic 
purchasing is relatively new in Kenya, the study seeks to understand purchaser and providers experiences during 
implementation and identify the influence of providers’ and purchasers’ sources of power, in relation to each 
other, on implementation outcomes – as power is a relational concept. 
An implementation lens: Peters et al. (2013) broadly define implementation research as ‘’ the scientific 
study of the processes used in the implementation of initiatives as well as the contextual factors that affect 
these processes’’ and recommend a list of implementation outcome variables that can be used when 
studying implementation. For this study we have selected two of these variables: acceptability and adoption. 
These are defined by Peters et al (2013) as follows: (1) adoption- the intentions, initial decisions, uptake, 
utilization and actions by actors to try use a new intervention; and (2) acceptability- the perception amongst 
actors regarding the agreeability, credibility and relative advantage of an intervention as well as their 
comfort with it. These implementation outcomes are likely to unravel hidden obstacles within the frequently 
bumpy interface between what can be achieved in theory and what occurs in practice (Peters et al. 2013). 
In addition, study of these outcome variables will also offer a better understanding of: the obstacles 
to/opportunities for scaling up of the interventions; how providers are disposed towards scaling up; what 
implementation strategies may be best suited to work over time; and the important influence of contextual 
factors (Peters et al. 2013) such as providers’ and purchasers’ sources of power influencing roll out of 
strategic purchasing mechanisms. 
Findings from the study are hoped to contribute to the minimal knowledge on experiences of purchasers in 
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rolling out strategic purchasing mechanisms in Kenya. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Social and Economic Factors 
Kenya is a low middle-income country (Barasa, Maina & Ravishanka 2017) situated in Eastern Africa with a 
population of about 43.18 Million people in 2012 (World Bank 2013) with an estimated annual increase of 
about one million people (World Bank 2012) and a GDP per capita of USD 993 in 2012 (KPMG 2013). Past 
recent economic growth has been sluggish compared to her regional counterparts with Kenya recording a 
GDP growth rate of about 4.3 percent. This is due to a myriad of external and internal factors inclusive of 
the economic aftershocks of the 2008 global economic crisis and Kenya’s 2007/08 post-election violence 
(KPMG 2013). However, since 2008 Kenya has recorded an overall gradual economic recovery phase 
inclusive of a new and progressive constitutional dispensation in 2010 and most recently a peaceful election 
in early 2013 (KPMG 2013). This has not only put the country back on the challenging journey to achieving 
middle income status by year 2030, as per Kenya’s economic blue print-Vision 2030 (Government of Kenya 
2007), but also created a more positive outlook for both public and private sectors continued growth, as well 
as refocusing national efforts on improving important social services such as health. 
2.2 Health Indicators in Kenya 
Although the government’s efforts to improve health outcomes for her people have yielded considerable 
gains over the past few decades, most health indicators in the country are however still poor by global 
standards with a life expectancy at birth of 60 years, an under-five mortality rate of 73 per 1000 live births 
and a maternal mortality ratio of 360 per 100,000 live births (WHO 2011). The leading causes of morbidity 
and mortality in the country are communicable, maternal, perinatal and nutritional conditions accounting 
for about 62 percent of all mortality in 2010 (WHO 2013). The country particularly suffers from a high HIV 
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burden although concerted efforts have lowered prevalence of HIV by about 40 percent from its peak in the 
early to mid-nineties to about 6.2 percent in 2010 and as well led to the achievement of a substantial ARV 
coverage rate of 83.1 percent amongst eligible adults (NACC, NASCOP 2012). However non-communicable 
diseases have gradually emerged as a serious concern for the country with an estimated combined 
contribution of about 28 percent of all deaths in 2011 with cardiovascular diseases and cancers accounting 
for 12 percent and 6 percent respectively (WHO 2013). 
Kenya is hence faced with the formidable challenge of an emerging epidemic of non-communicable diseases 
on the backdrop of a heavy longstanding burden of HIV and other communicable diseases resulting in a huge 
strain on the public health sector. 
2.3 Organization of the Health System in Kenya 
 
2.31 Public Provider System 
Kenya’s health care system is a relatively developed one in the region with a combination of both a public 
health system and a growing robust private health system. The public health system is multi-tiered having 
several levels of facilities. From the lowest level upwards this includes: public health care programs, 
previously organized as community care programs -level 1; dispensaries -level 2; health centers and 
maternity/nursing homes-level 3; primary (district & sub-district) hospitals-level 4; secondary (provincial) 
hospitals -level 5; and two tertiary national teaching and referral hospitals-level 6 (Luoma et al. 2010). With 
the political and centralized governance structures currently transitioning to a devolved system, the tertiary 
and provincial hospitals are envisaged to serve as national and regional referral hospitals respectively under 
national government with the rest of the facilities under county management; these will be managed by the 
forty seven newly created counties whereby level 4 hospitals will act as county referral hospitals whereas 
the rest will mainly provide primary and community care services to their respective counties (Government 
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of Kenya 2011). The public health system serves the majority of the population in the country but has been 
faced by a myriad of challenges ranging from under funding, poor stewardship, shortage of qualified health 
personnel and inability to cope with the growing disease burden from a rapidly growing population who are 
relatively poor with a significant section of the population having to seek alternative care from the private 
sector (Luoma et al. 2010). 
2.32 Private Provider System 
The Kenyan private sector market is relatively large, fairly well developed and expanding whereby by 
absolute value of source of financing for Total Health Expenditure (THE) the private sector market size grew 
by 13 percent from KSh. 40.1 Billion to KSh. 45.1 Billion comparing the estimates of the 2005/06 National 
Health Accounts (NHA) with those of the 2009/10 NHA respectively (Government of Kenya 2010). Private 
providers geographical distribution varies widely with the majority of the large and well established 
enterprises comprising of: large hospitals, outpatient medical centres, nursing and maternity homes, major 
pharmacies and private laboratories, specialized diagnostic centres, as well as private specialist clinics, being 
mainly located in the cities and major towns in Kenya, whilst the other group comprising of smaller 
institutions: smaller clinics and hospitals; drug shops and practitioners such as: nurses, mid wives, clinical 
officers and pharmacists; being mainly found in the rural areas and smaller towns of the country practising 
in relatively smaller scale partnerships or sole proprietorships (Barnes 2010). Faith based institutions (of 
which majority are Christian) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) owned facilities form the rest of 
the private facilities and serve quite a significant section of the population in both urban and rural areas 
(Barnes 2010). 
That the private health sector is largely inaccessible to most of the low income populations in Kenya whom 
even when they gain access to private services mostly depend on Out-of-Pocket (OOP) expenditures is 
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undeniable and worrying but nonetheless the private sector continues to play an important role in the 
overall provision of healthcare services in the nation and arguably still has significant potential to increase 
access to preventive and curative health services to more Kenyans (Barnes 2010). Varied illustrations of this 
significance include: 36 percent of all women during KDHS 08/09 were found to have sought family planning 
and contraception services from a private health facility (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2010); children 
with symptoms of acute respiratory infections reported to be more likely to be taken to a private provider 
over a public one (Barnes 2010); and is indeed also utilized by the poor as well with 47 percent of the poorest 
quintile reported to preferring taking a child to a private facility when sick (Marek et al. 2005). 
2.4 Health Care Purchasing 
Purchasing is commonly described as the transfer of pooled resources to health service providers on behalf 
of the population for whom funds were pooled in exchange for health services (Kutzin 2001). Purchasing 
could either be passive or strategic whereby in the former purchasers simply act as financial intermediaries. 
This frequently leads to provider-led cost escalation as opposed to the latter whereby purchasers use their 
financial power to actively demand quality and efficiency from providers, or alternatively create incentives 
for efficiency and quality by linking resource allocation with performance (Kutzin 2001). Some of these 
strategic purchasing mechanisms include: creation of financial incentives for providers through various 
provider payment mechanisms such as capitation that normally shift some of the financial risks of providing 
care to providers; use of a primary care gate-keeper to manage referrals and utilization of various benefits 
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such as non-emergency speciality services; prequalification of primary care providers; contracting with only 
pre-selected providers; creation and use of monitoring and feedback loop systems on: treatment, referral 
and prescribing practices of providers; and various forms of quality assurance and utilization review including 
pre authorization for elective admissions and intervening in clinical decision making by purchasers to reduce 
inappropriate services (Kutzin 2001). The World Health Report 2010 makes a strong case for a shift from 
passive to strategic purchasing mechanisms stating that ‘’passive purchasing leads to inefficiency’’ (WHO 
2010). Various strategic purchasing methods have been used by high income as well as low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs) to increase efficiency. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Thailand and Turkey have used 
case-based payment in their hospitals for cost control and to increase efficiency (Burduja 2008, Kutzin et al. 
2009, Langenbrunner, Cashin & O'Dougherty 2009, Ratanawijitrasin, Hirunrassamee 2009). In Finland, 
doctors are paid through a mix of salary, capitation and fee for service to improve efficiency (WHO 2010). 
Other countries such as Burundi, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda through 
performance linked purchasing arrangements have reported improved performance and resource 
optimization in various aspects of care such as increase in number of antenatal visits, higher proportions of 
women delivering in a health facility and improved child immunization coverage (Eichler 2009, Basinga et al. 
2010). 
It is important to note that roll out of strategic purchasing is generally associated with various changes in 
provider-purchaser relations and dynamics such as: providers bearing more financial risk for providing care; 
providers being subject to more accountability; and attenuation of the effects of information asymmetries 
and market inefficiencies characteristic of the health care market that tend to favour providers over 
consumers and purchasers, amongst others (WHO 2000). Hence these mechanisms frequently face 
opposition and reduced cooperation from providers (WHO 2000) and expectedly more so when shifting from 
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passive to strategic purchasing. Both providers and purchasers will then resultantly use different sources of 
power available to them to ensure they safeguard their interests such as: taking advantage of information 
asymmetries; economies of scale; institutional regulatory authority; legislative power; and higher bargaining 
capacities to influence pricing and quality of services offered (WHO 2000). 
This study cognisant of the significant potential adoption of strategic purchasing mechanisms has on 
improving performance of health financing systems (WHO 2000), describes two main such strategic 
purchasing mechanisms in Kenya as used by the NHIF and private purchasers. The study will also document 
various relevant sources of power as described earlier such as financial, institutional regulatory authority, 
contractual and provider payment arrangements. Through purchasers’ perspectives and experiences, the 
study will explore how these sources of power for both purchasers and providers may influence roll out of 
strategic purchasing mechanisms as follows: (1) purchasers using their power to promote/enforce provider 
acceptance and adoption of the mechanisms and; (2) providers using their power to resist acceptance and 
adoption of the mechanisms. 
2.5 Health Financing System in Kenya 
The health financing system in Kenya has multiple purchasers with one of the main challenges being 
longstanding low levels of funding. Total Health Expenditure (THE) as a percentage of GDP in 2011 was 4 % 
having remained fairly constant at this low level over the past few years averaging between 4 to 5 % since 
2001 (WHO 2011). With the three key functions of a health financing system being revenue collection, 
pooling and purchasing, Kenya’s health financing system can accordingly be briefly described as follows: 
Revenue collection: the main sources of revenue can be classified as external (donors) and domestic 
(government and private) sources as shown in figure 1 below. Government collects revenues mainly through 
general tax and contributions for the mandatory prepayment scheme known as National Hospital Insurance 
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Scheme (NHIF). NHIF is compulsory to all formal workers in the private and public sectors who consequently 
form the bulk of contributors although there have been recent efforts to increase coverage to the informal 
sector through voluntary contributions (Deloitte 2011b). Non state pre-payment mechanisms include: 
voluntary private health insurance schemes which typically cover high income population segments of whom 
majority live in urban areas (Deloitte 2011a); Employer Self-Funded medical schemes commonly found as 
part of employee benefits; and Community Based Health Financing Schemes (CBHFS) largely targeting rural 
and low income populations (Deloitte 2011a). 
Households bear a large burden of total health financing with Out-of Pocket (OOP) expenditures reported 
to have accounted for about a quarter of the 2009/10 THE (Government of Kenya 2010). OOP expenditure 
is the dominant form of paying for healthcare in the Kenyan private health care market occurring also in the 
public sector through cost sharing and user fees levied in public facilities (Deloitte 2011a). Most public 
facilities levying user fees have a few but weak exclusions mechanisms for the poor and vulnerable 
population segments such as waiver of fees for primary health services and for basic services to children 
aged five years and below (Luoma et al. 2010). 
Figure 1: Breakdown of Total Health Expenditure by financing source: 2001/02, 2005/06, 2009/10 (source: 
NHA 2009/10- Government of Kenya 2010) 
 
13  
Pooling: Pooling is highly fragmented with limited cross subsidization mechanisms and low population 
coverage in the country. Despite being signatory to the Abuja declaration, the Kenyan government has in 
the past not made considerable efforts to the commitment of allocating 15 percent of its annual government 
budget to the health sector with past health sector allocations falling far much below this with a high of 8.6 
percent in 2001/02 and gradually declining to 4.6 percent in 2009/10-whereby general government 
expenditure on health amounted to 28.8 percent of the 2009/10 THE (Government of Kenya 2010) 
equivalent to 2 percent of Kenya’s GDP (WHO 2011). In addition to the general tax pool other pools include: 
the NHIF, which is the largest membership pool with an estimated coverage of 2.8 million principal members 
and 6.6 million total lives covered (17 percent of population); various private prepaid health insurance pools 
with an estimated 700,000 lives covered (1.8 percent of population); and Community Based Healthcare 
Financing Schemes with an estimated 470, 000 lives covered -1.2 percent of the population (Deloitte 2011a). 
NHIF and private insurance mechanisms are estimated to cover only 20 percent of the population with about 
80 percent of the Kenyan population having no form of medical cover. The NHIF pool has the most diverse 
membership by income status by income status including upper, middle- and low-income earners as it is 
mandatory for all formal workers (Deloitte 2011b). It hence has the highest rate of risk cross subsidization 
compared to other existent pools in the country. In addition, NHIF has introduced two more pools recently; 
one for civil servants and disciplined forces (Omondi 2012); and the other for public school teachers (Karongo 
2012), with both schemes having enhanced benefit packages. 
Private health insurance pools typically cover high income population segments that typically have relatively 
lower disease burdens with the pools characterized by high fragmentation and sub optimal risk pooling and 
cross subsidization mechanisms (Deloitte 2011a). 
Purchasing: In Kenya, NHIF is the largest purchaser by membership size and purchases health services 
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through various mechanisms and from a wide range of public and private providers in the country. Prior to 
2010 NHIF was offering only inpatient plans through a rebate system for bed charges. This study focusses 
on the capitation model for the enhanced out-patient covers for all NHIF beneficiaries at public and select 
private facilities introduced in 2010 (Deloitte 2011b). 
NHIF has significantly evolved over the years since its establishment in 1966 as a department within the 
Ministry of Health to a semiautonomous body through the NHIF Act no 9 of 1998 with some of the key 
milestones highlighted in figure two below. Having been subject to great political control and manifesting 
poor accountability as characteristic of most government institutions in the 1980s and 1990s, NHIF has since 
then undergone significant restructuring and reforms in the wake of a political transformation that occurred 
in the early 2000s whereby some of the reforms it underwent from 2003 include: restructuring of its 
governance structures with formation of a more accountable board; roll out of deliberate initiatives to 
increase its: population coverage, branch network and adoption of innovative IT technologies; increased 
focus on transparency and accountability with a declaration of a ‘zero tolerance to corruption’ policy; and 
optimization of its workforce amongst others (Deloitte 2011b). Its reform processes and efforts to expand 
its mandate and population coverage have nonetheless been faced with multiple hurdles marked by 
controversies arising from influences of divergent political and stakeholder interests. This has resulted in 
multiple setbacks during attempts to roll out new coverage plans and contribution rates following various 
allegations from public bodies and other stakeholders such as: fund mismanagement, corruption and lack of 
sufficient stakeholder consultation resulting in several on-going court proceedings (Deloitte 2011b). 
15  
Figure 2: Overview of evolution of NHIF (Source: Deloitte 2011b) 
 
 
However some of the notable advances NHIF has made include: roll out of new purchasing mechanisms 
signifying a realization of the need to shift from the previous fee-for-service only provider payment 
mechanisms to use of more innovative provider payment mechanisms such as capitation; introduction of 
varying outpatient benefits in addition to the previous inpatient-only covers; a gradual increase in the 
number and diversity of facilities within its provider network; improved claims processing and payment 
durations; improved quality assurance processes through rollout of the Kenya Quality Model (KQM) 
standards as well as training providers on KQM; and representation on hospitals’ quality committees 
(Deloitte 2011b). 
As the anticipated lead government agency for the roll out of an envisioned national social insurance 
scheme, NHIF however still has quite some significant institutional reforms pending in order to effectively 
play this role (Deloitte 2011b) including further improvements on its purchasing functions. This study will 
seek to understand and explore roll out experiences of one of its new strategic purchasing mechanisms; use 
of a capitation model for purchasing outpatient healthcare services from private providers. The study, from 
the perspectives of key NHIF staff also seeks to understand how different sources of power are used by NHIF 
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and private providers to influence provider adoption and acceptance of this new model. 
Private purchasers in Kenya are multiple, diverse and can be grouped as follows: underwriters (insurance 
firms)- including those offering health micro-insurance products; Medical Insurance Providers (MIPs)- the 
equivalent of managed care organizations; Community Based Health Financing Schemes; and Employer in- 
house Schemes, as shown in Table 1 below (Deloitte 2011a). Private purchasers cover only about 2 percent 
of the total population (majority of who live in the cities and major towns) in Kenya and are largely out of 
reach for most citizens primarily due to unaffordability (Deloitte 2011b). Benefit packages of private 
purchasers are normally predetermined in advance and are largely influenced by consumers’ affordability 
with most purchasers having a preference for provision of inpatient and group covers as these are perceived 
to be more predictable and less risky compared to outpatient and individual covers (Deloitte 2011a). In 
addition, although most of the common conditions in Kenya are covered, there still exists varying restrictions 
in most benefit packages such as varying exclusions for chronic and pre-existing conditions; inclusion of co- 
payments; and in some cases, restriction to mission and government hospitals (Deloitte 2011a). Several 
factors have been attributed to contributing to the unaffordability of voluntary private health insurance in 
the country such as private providers being accused of unilaterally and repeatedly increasing prices of health 
services leading to surging medical inflation rates and resultant medical premium increases (Deloitte 2011b). 
The predominance of passive purchasing mechanisms amongst purchasers is also another factor 
contributing to high medical costs. This is exacerbated by a lack of adequate expertise amongst private 
purchasers to roll out and implement novel strategic purchasing mechanisms (Deloitte 2011a). Some of the 
major private providers also enjoy significant market power hence provider monopoly whereby a relatively 
small section of providers yields considerable power compared to private purchasers (Deloitte 2011a). These 
factors combined have also led to private purchasers having weakened bargaining power in relation to 
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providers as well as overall high inefficiency and surging costs of care in the sector (Deloitte 2011a). 
This paper also seeks to describe efforts by two of the main private purchasers in the country to employ 
strategic purchasing mechanisms in the running of their in-patient plans and in specific, intervening in clinical 
decision-making processes. In addition, the paper also seeks to describe the various sources of power for 
private providers and private purchasers and through a purchaser’s perspective also explore their 
application as follows: by private purchasers to influence/promote acceptability and adoption of strategic 
purchasing amongst private providers; and by private providers to resist or modify their acceptance and 
adoption of these mechanisms. 
Table 1: Overview of the main Prepaid Schemes in Kenya and their coverage. (Source: Deloitte 2011a) 
 
Type of prepaid scheme Number providing 
health Insurance 
Set Up Under Estimated number of 
persons covered 
NHIF 
(Public Social health 
insurance, mandatory in 
formal sector) 
1 NHIF act 1998 
Oversight by MOMS 
2.8 principal 
members 
6.6 million total lives 
Covered 
Private health insurance 
by insurance companies 
(Including health micro 
insurance) 
16 Insurers (out of 44) Insurance act Cap 487 
Regulated by IRA under 
ministry of Finance 
Covers 700,000 lives 
and some also have 
NHIF, especially 
those 
under employer 
groups 
as NHIF is mandatory 
Private health insurance 
by MIPs 
30 licensed (most are 
insurance 
intermediaries) 
6 Offer medical insurance 
Products 
Insurance Act Cap. 487 
Regulated by IRA 
Community based 
healthcare financing 
schemes 
30 (2006, Ten 
operational). 
9 organisations members 
of KCBHFA 
Ministry of Gender and Youth& 
Registrar of Societies 
Registered as societies, welfare 
groups or cultural organisations 
Approximately 
470,000 
Lives 
Employer in-house 
Schemes 
Several large and small 
schemes exist. Not 
documented 
N/A Not documented 
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The second group of private purchasers comprises of CBHIFs which are mostly found in rural areas of Kenya 
with an estimated total coverage of about 470,000 lives; although most offer comprehensive inpatient cover 
at their contracted facilities, they have had a limited overall impact on the population with a 2006 survey 
identifying 30 CBHFs in Kenya but with only 10 operational (Deloitte 2011a). Employer in-house managed 
schemes are also significant contributors to health financing whereby employers accounted for 3.3 percent 
of the 2005/06 THE with most schemes being found in the agricultural, parastatal, banking, energy and 
mining sectors; however further in-depth documentation on them still limited (Deloitte 2011a). 
 
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RATIONALE 
For Kenya to make significant progress towards UHC, optimization of resource use is critical with roll out of 
strategic purchasing mechanisms and scale up of existent ones bound to aid in improving efficiency. For 
example, as fee-for-service is the most dominant provider payment mechanism in the country, purchasers 
largely end up playing a passive role (Munge et al., 2015). This leads to various unfavourable effects on 
purchasers as follows: limited opportunities to negotiate on prices and costs in advance; increased 
vulnerability to supplier induced demand and provider over servicing; and private purchasers in particular 
having to grapple with high administrative expenses (Deloitte 2011a). Faced by these challenges amongst 
others, purchasers in Kenya have made efforts to use various strategic purchasing mechanisms to overcome 
the challenges such as (1) NHIF’s use of a capitation model for its out-patient cover and (2) private 
purchasers’ implementation of various select strategic purchasing mechanisms. Implementation outcomes 
of such efforts are to a significant extent influenced by how purchasers and providers are able to use their 
respective sources of power to either promote/enforce or to resist/modify provider adoption of strategic 
purchasing mechanisms (Deloitte 2011b, Deloitte 2011a, Kutzin, Cashin & Jakab 2010) when in a purchaser 
provider relationship. This study hence aims to: describe the strategic purchasing mechanisms outlined 
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earlier; investigate the various relevant sources of power for these actors as described earlier; and explore 
how purchasers and providers use their power to influence provider acceptability and adoption of these 
interventions. Research findings are hoped to contribute to the understanding of some of the on-going 
strategic purchasing mechanisms in the Kenyan context as well as the challenges facing their acceptability 
and adoption by providers. 
4. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Use of conceptual frameworks and theory is integral to health policy and systems research. As outlined by 
Gilson (2012) theory can be used in clarifying and explaining complex phenomena within their context and 
offer basis for generating hypothesis and conceptual frameworks. The framework used in this study is a 
modified version of one shown by WHO (1999) (figure 3) to describe how various forms of strategic 
purchasing mechanisms and provider payment methods distribute financial risks of providing care from 
purchasers to providers. 
Figure 3: Various strategic purchasing mechanism and provider payment methods and how they transfer 
financial risk to providers. Source: (World Health Organization 1999) 
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The various empirical and theoretical literatures described earlier on healthcare purchasing, provider 
payment methods (WHO 2000, Kutzin 2001), as well as on sources of power for providers and purchasers 
(Lagarde et al. 2010, Mathauer et al. 2017, McKee and Brand 2005, Pauly 1998, 2001, WHO 2000, WHO, 
2010) and implementation research (David et al. 2013) have been used to create the modified conceptual 
framework (figure 4) used in the study. Based on the hypothesis that providers will naturally resist strategic 
purchasing mechanisms subjecting them to higher accountability as well as to bearing higher financial risks 
of providing care (WHO 2000, Kutzin 2001), the above framework is then modified to reflect the anticipated 
use of different sources of power by purchasers and providers to influence adoption and acceptability of 
specified strategic purchasing mechanisms in the country (see figure 4 below). 
Figure 4: Conceptual framework showing various strategic purchasing mechanisms, provider and 
purchaser sources 
of power and their influence on the interventions (Modified from WHO 1999) 
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This modified framework illustrates implementation of additional strategic purchasing mechanisms 
including the use of contracts to selectively accredit providers, intervening in clinical decision-making 
processes, negotiating prices of care with providers, use of preauthorization processes, hiring staff with 
medical knowledge and use of step–down procedures. Shifts from passive to strategic purchasing 
mechanisms are illustrated as a transition from the left to the right side of the diagram whereby the risk of 
providing care gradually shifts towards providers. As purchasers implement these mechanisms, providers 
will naturally tend to resist them due to the increased financial risk transfer and need for their accountability 
(WHO 2000, Kutzin 2001). Purchasers will on the other hand use their various sources of power to promote 
provider adoption and acceptance of these mechanisms. 
 
5. RESEARCH AIMS 
The study is aimed at documenting the role of power between two parties in influencing the implementation 
of strategic purchasing in Kenya. The study describes early implementation of capitation models by the 
National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) for out-patient coverage, and efforts to implement various select 
strategic purchasing mechanisms by private purchasers. The study also aims to explore and analyse various 
sources of power for purchasers and private providers in Kenya and the influence of use power by either 
party on private provider acceptance and adoption of strategic purchasing mechanisms. 
 
6. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How are select strategic purchasing mechanisms implemented in Kenya and what role do the various 
sources of power for purchasers and private providers have in influencing acceptance and adoption 
of strategic purchasing mechanisms by providers? 
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7. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
I. To describe early implementation (specifically acceptability and adoption by private providers) of 
strategic purchasing mechanisms in Kenya as below: 
a. NHIF’s capitation model for its outpatient plans 
 
b. Select mechanisms implemented by private purchasers in Kenya including use of contracts to 
selectively accredit providers, intervening in clinical decision-making processes, negotiating 
prices of care with providers, use of preauthorization processes, hiring staff with medical 
knowledge and use of step–down procedures. 
c. To identify whether sources of power for purchasers and private providers play a role in 
implementation outcomes. Sources of power include (1) Market power such as pooled 
financial resources, monopoly/monopsony amongst others (2) Institutional regulatory 
authority (3) Provider payment mechanisms such as capitation for purchasers and FFS for 
providers (4) Information asymmetry and technical expertise (5) Any other significant source 
of power that may arise 
II. To explore the influence of various sources of power for private providers and purchasers on provider 
acceptance and adoption of strategic purchasing mechanisms as follows: 
a. How purchasers use their power to promote or enforce acceptance and adoption of strategic 
purchasing mechanisms in their relationship with private providers 
b. How private providers in their relationship with purchasers use their power to resist or modify 
their acceptance and adoption of strategic purchasing mechanisms 
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8. METHODOLOGY 
 
8.1 Study Design 
The study employs a multiple case study design. A case study is an ‘empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin 2009). Case study methods are particularly 
useful in social sciences in the following ways: aiding researchers answer ‘why’ and ‘how’ research questions; 
understanding complex phenomena that do not require control of behavioural events of respondents; and 
in studies focussing on contemporary events (Yin 2009). The study will have an exploratory case study 
component that will help ‘develop propositions for further inquiry’ (Yin 2009) such as ‘what are the market 
forces that give rise to power in healthcare?’ The study also has an explanatory case study component that 
asks ‘how’ questions in a bid to draw linkages between various phenomena (Yin 2009) such as ‘how do 
private providers and purchasers use their different sources of power to influence implementation outcomes 
of strategic purchasing mechanisms’. 
A multiple-case design composed of multiple units of study (cases) each with comparatively different 
contexts (see figure 4 below) as described by Yin (2009) is used whereby implementation of capitation by 
the NHIF amongst private provider facilities will form the first case whilst implementation of select strategic 
purchasing mechanisms by private purchasers amongst private provider facilities comprises the second case. 
Although there are overlaps between the contexts of NHIF and private purchasers there are significant 
differences such as: use of different strategic purchasing mechanisms such as capitation versus intervening 
in in-patient decision making processes with both having different approaches; significant variance in 
composition of provider panel with NHIF’s capitation model involving numerous out-patient facilities whilst 
private providers largely having smaller range of in-patient facilities; and use of different sources of power 
amongst others; hence the choice of a multiple-case study design. 
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Figure 5: Basic Types of Designs for Case Studies (Source Yin 2009) 
 
 
The study will explore various sources of power for purchasers and private providers and their influence on 
provider acceptability and adoption of the strategic purchasing mechanisms from a purchaser’s perspective. 
This will be done through conducting in-depth interviews with several select key informants drawn from the 
NHIF, select private purchasers and in addition a few other relevant stakeholders in Kenya as described 
further below. In-depth interviewing is a qualitative research technique comprising of intensive individual 
interviews (Neale & Boyce 2006) that enables researchers explore feelings and perspectives of respondents 
on a subject (Guion, Diehl & McDonald 2001).  The use of documents comprising of contracts between 
providers and purchasers, newspaper articles and grey literature will also be used to supplement the findings 
from the interviews. Bowen (2009) and Yin (2009) note that documentation in case study as a source of 
evidence is important in corroborating and augmenting interview data by serving as a form of triangulation. 
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8.2 Study Population and Sampling 
The study population we seek to interview includes people within purchaser organizations in the country 
from both the public and private sectors who are have engaged in implementation, we will try and reach out 
to private providers as well as health experts but primarily we are looking at the relationship from the 
purchaser perspective. Respondents from within these institutions will also be recruited through a purposive 
sampling strategy. Purposive selection of cases in case study research enables prior theory and initial 
assumptions to be tested (Gilson 2012). Further, purposive sampling in case study and qualitative research 
allows inclusion of as many possible factors that may influence behaviours of respondents central to a study 
focus enabling gathering of views from a wide range of perspectives (Gilson 2012). Through this sampling 
strategy it will be possible to deliberately recruit respondents working in different roles and interacting with 
providers at varying organizational levels as explained further below. 
The NHIF is selected in the first case as it is the national health purchaser in the country. For Private 
purchasers, the following inclusion criteria will apply: (1) a registered private insurance firm or a firm 
registered as a private medical insurance company offering inpatient medical insurance as one of its 
products; (2) a health purchaser who can be deemed to be a major player in the sector by being amongst 
the top four health purchasers by market share; and (3) a health purchaser that carries considerable financial 
risk in offering health insurance plans as it is this risk that compels purchasers to employ strategic purchasing 
mechanisms and hence transferring some of the financial risks of meeting patient’s medical needs to 
providers (Kutzin 2001). Institutions having both payer and provider arms (also known as HMOs), third party 
administrators, CBHIS and employer self-funded schemes are thus excluded to narrow focus on purchasers 
who bear significant financial risk. 
Private sector providers will be defined to include formal private sector players as follows; (1) Clinics: General 
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Practitioners, and Specialists; (2) Hospitals; (3) Medical Centers; and (4) Nursing Homes. 
8.2.1 Selection of participants within purchasing organizations 
Participants will be selected from the Purchasers of interest to this study. From each purchaser organization 
two to three participants will be interviewed. Sampling will be done purposively to include respondents 
working at varying organizational levels and with different roles and responsibilities in regard to the strategic 
purchasing mechanism for each institution. Senior management staff targeted includes those heading 
medical insurance business and managers overseeing provider relations or purchasing operations and will 
be identified for each purchaser institution and requested for interview. Through these staff more 
respondents will be identified to trace staff working directly with providers or actively implementing the 
strategic purchasing mechanisms as per each purchaser organization. For example, for NHIF this may include 
staff in charge of recruitment and monitoring of providers under the capitation model whilst for private 
purchasers this may include medical personnel employed to engage with providers as a way of intervening 
in medical decision-making processes. 
About 6 to 8 interviews with respondents from public and private purchasers and 1-2 interviews with other 
relevant stakeholders are anticipated to be carried out as shown in table 2 below. Other key informants that 
may be contacted to provide an outsider perspective as well as enrich insight may include resource persons 
drawn from private provider organizations and health sector experts. We would be particularly keen to 
understand implementation from the private provider perspective. 
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8.3 Data Collection and Management 
In-depth interview methods will be used as the main data collection method by administering an interview 
guide (see appendix one and two) to the selected participants. In-depth interviewing is a qualitative research 
technique comprising of intensive individual interviews (Boyce, Neale 2006) whereby an open-ended, 
discovery-oriented method is used allowing interviewers to deeply explore the feelings and perspectives of 
respondents on a subject (Guion, Diehl & McDonald 2011). In-depth interviewing is also most appropriate 
for situations when one wants to derive detailed information from a relatively small number of participants 
(Boyce, Neale 2006) as is the case in this study. 
All interviews will be conducted by the principal researcher and will be recorded and transcribed into DVD 
format thereafter. The transcripts will be stored in the form of password protected Microsoft Word files 
saved in the researcher’s laptop computer accessible to the researcher only. Hard copies of interview scripts 
will be stored securely under lock and key. A second source of evidence will comprise documentation such 
as policy briefs, institutional records, reports, newspapers, websites and other relevant documents. 
Documentation in case study as a source of evidence is important in corroborating and augmenting interview 
data by serving as a form of triangulation (Yin 2009). 
As outlined by Yin (2009) on case study research methods, a case study database will also be created and 
will include the following four components: (1) case study notes from the investigator’s own notes from 
interviews, observations or document analysis; (2) case study documents-materials collected during the 
study of which an annotated bibliography will be made where necessary; (3) tabular materials either 
collected during the study or created by the researcher; and (4) narratives produced by the investigator from 
the interviews. 
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Table 2: Overview of the main eligible private purchaser institutions for study (Source Deloitte 2011a, 
Deloitte 2011b) 
 
Purchaser Comments Interviewee 
Selection 
Public Social 
health 
insurance, 
mandatory 
and voluntary 
Contributors 
NHIF Inpatient and outpatient services with 
the largest pool of beneficiaries country 
wide 
Purposeful sampling of 2 or 
more select Key 
interviewees 
Use of snowballing 
techniques where needed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Private 
Purchasers, 
Voluntary 
contributors 
Jubilee Highest Market Share total by gross 
annual premiums, Inpatient and 
outpatient plans for groups and 
Individuals 
Purposeful sampling of 2 or 
more  select Key 
interviewees per purchaser 
Use of  snowballing 
techniques where needed APA 2nd by market share, Inpatient and 
outpatient plans for groups and 
Individuals 
UAP 3rd by market Share, Inpatient and 
outpatient plan for groups and 
individuals 
CIC Has the largest pool for low cost products 
-30,000 lives 
Heritage Inpatient and outpatient plan for groups 
and individuals 
Excluded from sampling 
frame due to either low 
market share or lack of 
significant financial risk 
bearing 
Britak Market share, Inpatient plans for groups 
Resolution Inpatient and outpatient plan for groups 
and individuals, previously HMO 
AAR Inpatient and outpatient plan for groups 
and individuals, previously HMO 
Pacis, Catholic church founded, Inpatient 
products group plans, profitable 
8.4 Data Analysis 
In addition to the interviews the researcher will also capture field notes during the entire study to increase 
research rigor. The field notes will provide additional data for analysis. 
Each case will be analyzed separately using thematic content analysis that will involve familiarization with 
the data, and identification of codes and themes through the deductive application of the conceptual 
framework while staying open to inductive themes; (Green & Thorogood 2018). This will also involve 
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organizing data horizontally by codes, putting similar data together to build categories and finally looking at 
further relationship from the codes (Green & Thorogood 2018). 
Document analysis will be used to supplement the data and a similar process of based on the same themes 
used in analysis of the interview scripts will be followed. It will also involve carefully reading and re-reading 
of the data to identify patterns in the data (Bowen, 2009). Two distinct case reports will then be generated. 
Cross case analysis techniques will then be used to analyse the two cases through comparative analysis that 
will involve comparing and merging pertinent themes from the cases (Creswell, 2007, Stake, 2013). 
Various means of ensuring rigor and trustworthiness (Gilson 2012) that will be employed triangulation of 
data with field notes, triangulation within and across cases, and triangulation externally such as using 
relevant documentation. 
 
9. ETHICS 
Ethics approval will be sought through the established ethics approval system as prescribed by the University 
of Cape Town which will also entail informed consent and confidentiality. The study will also be sensitive to 
any conflict of interests and business risks that may be raised by any of the respondents. Other measures 
that will be applied include: (1) informing the participants in writing of the voluntary nature of participation, 
right to withdraw anytime and right to decline to divulge any personal or institutional information they may 
be unwilling to share; (2) informing in writing and elucidating the research objectives and data collection 
methods to participants; (3) providing an informed consent form to all participants and meeting and 
safeguarding all of their privacy needs ; and (4) providing written transcriptions of the data and ensuring all 
confidentiality needs of participants are met and safeguarded 
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10. STAKE HOLDERS REPORTING 
A copy of the thesis report and findings will be publicly availed to all the participants and stakeholders as 
soon as possibly feasible. 
 
 
11. LIMITATIONS 
Limiting the scope to few select private purchasers and thus not covering the full extent of private purchasers 
may limit generalizations. Focus on only private health providers and leaving out the public sector which 
accounts for the bulk of NHIF’s health care provision may also lead to narrowed breadth on NHIF’s work in 
purchasing. Further, full access and thorough study of all relevant documentation evidence may not be 
possible due to confidentiality and business risks concerns by private purchasers as well as possible caution 
by NHIF respondents on issues regarding capitation that are currently under investigations or related to 
ongoing court processes. As this is a typically small-scale project characteristic of a stand-alone individual 
master’s mini dissertation project and in addition without external funding support, a wider scope and long 
standing field engagement is also not feasible. 
 
12. LOGISTICS 
Anticipated timelines and milestones for the study are as shown in Table 3 
below; 
Table 3: Anticipated timelines and milestones for the study 
 
 Activity Timelines 
1 Identifying and refining research topic July, August 2013 
2 Identifying supervisors and bringing partners 
on board –SHOPs, 
August 2013 
3 Protocol write up, revision and approval September 2013 
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4 Refinement of instruments and study 
design/proposal 
Contacting selected respondents 
October 2013 to October 2015 
5 Data collection October 2015 to February 2017 
6 Data Analysis Jan 2016 to March 2017 
7 Thesis write up and Submission March 2017 to Feb 2018 
8 Dissemination of findings July 2014 onwards 
 
 
13. BUDGET 
A summary of the planned budget is as shown in table 4 below. This is self-funded by the researcher. 
Planning, permissions and mapping costs will involve costs incurred both in Cape Town and Nairobi during 
development of research proposal and tools, identification and contacting of various respondents as well as 
setting up interviews and seeking relevant authorizations. Data collection costs involve costs of a junior 
researcher (undergraduate student) to aid in recording of interviews as well as transcription of recorded 
interviews. The principal investigator will then go through all the transcripts and audio records to ensure 
accuracy of the transcripts. Other costs involved also include acquisition of a tape recorder and printing and 
stationary costs. 
Table 4: Summary of the planned project budget 
RESEARCH STAGES ITEMS QUANTITY UNIT COST (ZAR) TOTAL 
COST 
(ZAR) 
Planning, permissions and 
mapping;  Developing and 
testing questionnaire 
Transport and logistics costs 10 R 100 R 1,000 
Data collection and 
management 
Dissemination and reporting 
Junior Researchers' fee per 
day & transcription costs 
 
10 
 
R 200 
 
R 2,000 
Printing and stationary 500 R 1 R 500 
Recording Equipment 1 R 500 R 500 
TOTAL    R 4,000 
 Administration & 
Contingency 
10%  R 400 
TOTAL COSTS    R 4,400 
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15. APPENDICES 
15.1 APPENDIX 1: Research Questionnaire - NHIF 
1. How long have you worked in health financing and health insurance in the country? 
2. How long have you worked at NHIF and what is your current role at NHIF as regards to health care financing? 
3. Are you involved in the roll out of the new capitation model? Could you describe your involvement so far 
4. Please describe the capitation model as applied by NHIF to implement its outpatient scheme? 
5. How was the model rolled out amongst the private providers? (Was there any consultation, price and rates 
negotiation, prior agreement on provider selection and contracting terms etc.?) 
6. What were the initial reactions from providers to the way the capitation model was rolled out? Are there any 
experiences from initial engagements such as first meetings, feedback from providers? 
7. Were there any elements of the roll out they were disagreeable on? Please explain. 
8. How did private providers express any such disagreement? 
9. Did NHIF have any power to enforce/promote their terms and protect its interests in cases where providers 
were not fully agreeable? 
10. Please explain in detail sources of such power and how they were used by NHIF 
11. Did private providers have any powers to resist NHIF capitation terms and promote their interests regarding any 
aspects they were not agreeable with? 
12. Please explain in detail sources of such power and how they were used by private providers to modify or resist 
aspects of the capitation model that they were not fully agreeable with? 
13. Could you describe the main successes of the roll out this far? 
14. Could you describe the main challenges of the roll out so far? 
15. What do you think will happen in the future? Why do you think this? 
35  
16. Is there anything else you think I may have missed that is relevant to our discussion that you’d like to add? 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME!!! 
 
 
 
15.2 APPENDIX 2: Research Questionnaire - PRIVATE PURCHASERS 
1) How long have you worked in health financing and health insurance in the country? 
2) What is your current/main role at this institution as regards to health insurance? 
3) Does your institution intervene in clinical decision making processes in the management of inpatient medical 
schemes? If so please list the various methods used and your involvement. 
4) Please describe each of the interventions above in detail. Explain how and when they were rolled out. 
5) What are the objectives of each of the methods and how successful have they been in achieving them? 
6) What were the initial reactions from providers to the use of these interventions? Are there any experiences 
from initial engagements such as first meetings, feedback from providers? 
7) Were there any elements of these interventions that providers were disagreeable on? Please explain. 
 
8) How did private providers express any such disagreement? 
9) Did your firm have any power to enforce/promote these interventions protect your interests in cases where 
providers were not fully agreeable? 
10) Please explain in detail sources of such power and how you used them 
11) Did private providers have any power to resist full implementation of the interventions or that prevented the 
interventions achieving their full objectives? 
12) Please explain in detail sources of such power and how they were used by private providers to protect their 
interests or modify/resist aspects of the interventions that they were not fully agreeable with? 
13) Could you describe the main successes of the interventions so far? 
14) Could you describe the main challenges of the roll out so far? 
15) What do you think will happen in the future? Why do you think this? 
16) Is there anything else you think I may have missed that is relevant to our discussion that you’d like to add? 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME!!! 
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15.3 APPENDIX 3: Informed Consent Form-NHIF 
This informed consent form is for respondents working with the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) in Kenya who are 
to take part in a study as detailed below involving in-depth interviews describing the capitation model as used by NHIF in 
purchase of outpatient health services from private providers in Kenya. The study is for the purposes of fulfilment of 
requirements for an MPH dissertation at University of Cape Town as described below. 
 
Name of Principal Investigator: Dr. Benson Chuma 
Organization: Graduate Student, School of Public Health, University of Cape Town, S. Africa 
Project Title  Active Purchasing Mechanisms of Private Healthcare Services: Experiences 
of Public and Private Purchasers in Kenya 
 
This Informed Consent Form has two parts: 
I. Information Sheet (to share information about the study with you) 
II. Certificate of Consent (for signatures if you choose to participate) 
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Respondents will be given a copy of the full Informed Consent Form 
PART I: INFORMATION SHEET 
 
My name is Dr. Benson Chuma and I am currently conducting a study as part of my Master of Public Health graduate 
program at the School of Public Health-University of Cape Town, South Africa. 
You do not have to decide today whether or not you will participate in the study. Before you decide, you can talk to anyone 
you feel comfortable with about the study. 
This consent form may contain words that you do not understand. Please ask me to stop as we go through the information 
and I will take time to explain. If you have questions later, you can ask them of me 
 
 
Purpose of the research 
The aim of the study is to seek ways of improving health financing in Kenya by understanding the current active purchasing 
mechanisms in the country and how they could be improved on. I intend to describe active purchasing mechanisms in the 
country as follows: 
• NHIF: use of capitation in its outpatient medical scheme 
• Private Insurers: use of select strategic purchasing mechanisms to purchase services amongst private 
providers 
 
This questionnaire is in regard to NHIF as listed above and in addition I will also seek to understand existing power 
differences such as financial, economies of scale, monopolies and bargaining capacities amongst others between NHIF 
and private providers and how they influence outcomes of such activities. 
Findings of the research are aimed at providing insight on how such power differences between providers and purchasers 
shape active purchasing mechanisms with the hope that this knowledge can be used to influence policies favorable to roll 
out and expansion of active purchasing mechanisms 
 
Participant Selection 
You are being invited to take part in this research because we feel that your experience working with the NHIF will provide 
the relevant knowledge and insight that we seek 
 
Procedures 
We are asking you to help us learn more about purchasing of health services from the private sector as above. If 
you accept, you will be asked to take part in an in-depth interview with the principal investigator which will last 
about one hour. The questions will entail describing how NHIF rolled out the capitation model for its outpatient 
health plan. The discussion will also involve description of various sources of power (such as economies of scale, 
regulatory, monopoly/monopsony and bargaining capacities amongst others) between private providers and 
NHIF and their influence on the outcomes of the efforts described above. 
 
WE WILL NOT ASK YOU TO SHARE ANY CONFIDENTIAL, PERSONAL OR INSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT YOU ARE 
NOT COMFORTABLE SHARING. 
 
The discussion will take place in a mutually agreed location, and will involve the respondent and the principal 
investigator. The entire discussion will be tape-recorded, but no respondent will be identified by name on the tape. Also 
no comment or information from the interview will be ascribed to any respondent in particular. The tape will be kept 
securely under custodianship of the principal investigator and later on at the University of Cape Town. The information 
recorded is confidential and no one else except the research team will have access to the tapes. The tapes will be 
destroyed after about 6 months 
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Benefits 
The study is aimed at contributing to the body of knowledge that supports an improved policy environment for purchasers 
to roll out and expand on active purchasing mechanisms. You will also personally receive a detailed report of the findings 
and policy recommendations prior to public dissemination or publication 
You will not be provided any monetary incentive to take part in the research. 
 
Confidentiality 
We will not be sharing any information about the respondents with anyone outside of the research team. The 
information collected will be kept private and confidential. All information about you will have a number on it instead of 
your name. Only the researchers will know what your number is and that information will be under restricted access. 
 
Who to Contact 
If you have any questions, you can ask them now or later. If you wish to ask questions later, you may contact any of the 
following: 
 
Dr. Benson Chuma 
bensonchuma@gmail.com 
+254 726 731 662/ +27 719 514 629 
Graduate student 
Health Economics Unit- University of Cape Town 
 
Veloshnee Govender 
Veloshnee.Govender@uct.ac.za 
Tel:+ 27 21 406 6752 
Researcher and Lecturer 
Health Economics Unit- University of Cape Town 
 
If you want any information regarding your rights as a research participant, or complaints regarding this research study, 
you may contact Professor Marc Blockman at the University of Cape Town Faculty of Health Sciences Human Research 
Ethics Committee which is an independent Committee established to help protect the rights of research participants on 
telephone number 021 4066492 
 
PART II: CERTIFICATE OF CONSENT 
I have read the foregoing information, or it has been read to me. I have had the opportunity to 
ask questions about it and any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I 
consent voluntarily to be a participant in this study 
Print Name of Participant   
 
Signature of Participant    
Date   Day/month/year 
 
STATEMENT BY THE RESEARCHER 
I have accurately read out the information sheet to the potential participant, and to the best of 
my ability made sure that the participant understands that the following will be done: 
1. Participation in an in-depth interview as explained 
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2. Recording of the interview 
3. Assurance of anonymity and confidentiality 
 
I confirm that the participant was given an opportunity to ask questions about the study, and all 
the questions asked by the participant have been answered correctly and to the best of my 
ability. I confirm that the individual has not been coerced into giving consent, and the consent 
has been given freely and voluntarily. 
 
A copy of this Informed Consent Form has been provided to the participant. 
Print Name of Researcher   
Signature of Researcher /person taking the consent    
Date    
Day/month/year 
 
 
 
15.4 APPENDIX 4: Informed Consent Form-PRIVATE PURCHASERS 
This informed consent form is for respondents working In Private Health Insurance firms in Kenya who are to take part in 
a study as detailed below involving in-depth interviews describing active purchasing mechanisms insurers in Kenya to 
purchase private health services. The study is for the purposes of fulfillment of requirements for an MPH dissertation at 
University of Cape Town, South Africa. 
Name of Principal Investigator: Dr. Benson Chuma 
Organization: Graduate Student, School of Public Health, University of Cape Town, South Africa 
Project Title Active Purchasing Mechanisms of Private Healthcare Services: Experiences of Public 
and Private Purchasers in Kenya 
This Informed Consent Form has two parts: 
• Information Sheet (to share information about the study with you) 
• Certificate of Consent (for signatures if you choose to participate) 
Respondents will be given a copy of the full Informed Consent Form 
PART I: INFORMATION SHEET 
Introduction 
My name is Dr. Benson Chuma and I am currently conducting a study as part of my graduate program as described above. 
Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. It is your choice whether to participate or not. The choice that you 
make will have no bearing on your job or on any work-related evaluations or reports. You may change your mind later and 
stop participating even if you agreed earlier. 
This consent form may contain words that you do not understand. Please ask me to stop as we go through the information 
and I will take time to explain. If you have questions later, you can ask them of me 
Purpose of the research 
The aim of the study is to seek ways of improving health financing in Kenya by understanding the current active purchasing 
mechanisms in the country and how they could be improved on. I intend to describe active purchasing mechanisms in the 
country as follows: 
• NHIF: use of capitation model in its outpatient medical scheme 
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• Private Insurers: use of select strategic purchasing mechanisms to purchase services amongst private 
providers 
This questionnaire is in regard to private insurers as above. I will seek to understand how the above is implemented, 
challenges involved and in addition private providers’ responses and influence on implementation of the above 
mechanisms. 
Findings of the research are aimed at providing insight on how providers and purchasers actions influence outcomes of 
such active purchasing mechanisms with the hope that this knowledge can be used to influence policies favorable to roll 
out and expansion of active purchasing mechanisms 
Participant Selection 
You are being invited to voluntarily take part in this research because we feel that your experience in the Kenyan private 
health insurance sector will provide the relevant knowledge and insight we seek 
Procedures 
We are asking you to help us learn more about purchasing of health services from the private sector as above. If you 
accept, you will be asked to take part in an in-depth interview with the principal investigator which will last about one 
hour. The questions will entail describing how your institution (or private health insurers in Kenya in general) intervenes 
in clinical decisions making processes to ensure quality assurance and cost control in the management of in-patient 
plans. The discussion will also involve description of various sources of power (such as economies of scale, regulatory, 
monopoly/monopsony and bargaining capacities amongst others) between private providers and private health insurers 
and their influence on the outcomes of the efforts described above. 
WE WILL NOT ASK YOU TO SHARE ANY CONFIDENTIAL, PERSONAL OR INSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT YOU ARE 
NOT COMFORTABLE SHARING. 
 
 
The discussion will take place in a mutually agreed location, and will involve the respondent and the principal 
investigator. The entire discussion will be tape-recorded, but no respondent will be identified by name on the tape. Also, 
no comment or information from the interview will be ascribed to any respondent in particular. The tape will be kept 
securely under custodianship of the principal investigator and later on at the University of Cape Town. The information 
recorded is confidential and no one else except the research team will have access to the tapes. The tapes will be 
destroyed after about 6 months 
Benefits 
The study is aimed at contributing to the body of knowledge that supports an improved policy environment for purchasers 
to roll out and expand on active purchasing mechanisms. You will also personally receive a detailed report of the findings 
and policy recommendations prior to public dissemination or publication 
You will not be provided any monetary incentive to take part in the research. 
Confidentiality 
We will not be sharing any information about the respondents with anyone outside of the research team. The 
information collected will be kept private and confidential. All information about you will have a number on it instead of 
your name. Only the researchers will know what your number is and that information will be under restricted access. 
 
Who to Contact 
If you have any questions, you can ask them now or later. If you wish to ask questions later, you may contact any of the 
following: 
 
Dr. Benson Chuma 
bensonchuma@gmail.com 
+254 726 731 662/ +27 719 514 629 
Graduate student 
Health Economics Unit- University of Cape Town 
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Veloshnee Govender 
Veloshnee.Govender@uct.ac.za 
Tel:+ 27 21 406 6752 
Researcher and Lecturer 
Health Economics Unit- University of Cape Town 
 
If you want any information regarding your rights as a research participant, or complaints regarding this research study, 
you may contact Professor Marc Blockman at the University of Cape Town Faculty of Health Sciences Human Research 
Ethics Committee which is an independent Committee established to help protect the rights of research participants on 
telephone number 021 4066492 
PART II: CERTIFICATE OF CONSENT 
I have read the foregoing information, or it has been read to me. I have had the opportunity to 
ask questions about it and any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I 
consent voluntarily to be a participant in this study 
Print Name of Participant   
 
Signature of Participant    
Date  _ Day/month/year 
 
 
STATEMENT BY THE RESEARCHER 
 
I have accurately read out the information sheet to the potential participant, and to the best of 
my ability made sure that the participant understands that the following will be done: 
1. Participation in an in-depth interview as explained 
2. Recording of the interview 
3. Assurance of anonymity and confidentiality 
 
I confirm that the participant was given an opportunity to ask questions about the study, and all 
the questions asked by the participant have been answered correctly and to the best of my 
ability. I confirm that the individual has not been coerced into giving consent, and the consent 
has been given freely and voluntarily. 
 
A copy of this Informed Consent Form has been provided to the participant. 
Print Name of Researcher   
Signature of Researcher /person taking the consent    
 
 
Date   Day/month/year 
  
PART B 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This introduction provides an outline of the objectives of the literature review, description of the 
search methodology employed as well as the overall organization of the literature review. This 
literature review was undertaken to support the study on the implementation of strategic 
purchasing mechanisms in Kenya with the research question as follows: 
How are select strategic purchasing mechanisms implemented in Kenya and what role do the 
various sources of power for purchasers and private providers have in influencing acceptance 
and adoption of strategic purchasing mechanisms by providers? 
 
Purchasing in healthcare is described as the transfer of pooled resources to health service providers 
on behalf of the population for whom funds were pooled in exchange for health services. Purchasing 
could either be passive or active, in the latter purchasers do not simply act as financial 
intermediaries but play a more proactive role (Kutzin, 2001). Active purchasing is now commonly 
referred to as strategic purchasing (Honda, 2014). 
The objectives of this literature review are as follows: 
 
a) To give an overview and background of the health financing system in Kenya with emphasis 
on health care purchasing 
b) To present an overview of the role of strategic purchasing in supporting the achievement of 
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) 
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c) To present concepts relevant to purchasing of health services, an overview of the conceptual 
framework as used in the study, an overview of the concept of implementation, and an 
overview of the concept of power. 
d) To provide a summary of relevant literature on the implementation of strategic purchasing 
mechanisms 
 
 
In order to identify relevant literature to achieve these objectives an initial search of PubMed and 
Google Scholar search engines was done for papers appearing between 2010 and 2014. Key words 
included strategic purchasing, provider power, purchaser power, implementation AND strategic 
purchasing mechanisms, adoption AND strategic purchasing mechanisms, provider payment 
mechanisms, and the National Hospital Insurance Fund in Kenya. Abstracts were reviewed, and 
papers were included as relevant if they met at least one of the following criteria: (1) were related 
to implementation of active/strategic purchasing and/or provider acceptance and adoption; (2) 
focused on sources of power for providers and purchasers (3) or showcased interactions between 
providers and purchasers in relation to implementation of active/strategic purchasing. There was a 
limited amount of relevant information on implementation of strategic purchasing retrieved for the 
period from 2010 to 2014 using the above search criteria and the initial search (which yielded 17 
papers) was later broadened to include papers published from 2000 and up until 2018 (which 
yielded an additional 29 papers). We also searched for grey literature, presentations, news 
publications and relevant reports using google. Websites of various organizations such as leading 
media stations in Kenya, private purchasers in Kenya, the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) 
in Kenya, the Association of Kenya Insurers (AKI) and Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA) were also 
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searched. 
Organization of the sections 
 
Section one provides a description of the economic and social context of Kenya and is then followed 
by a discussion of the healthcare financing environment in Kenya to help set the scene for the work. 
Section two provides an overview of strategic purchasing and provides a categorization of strategic 
purchasing mechanisms. Section three provides an overview of the conceptual framing of the study 
and an overview of relevant concepts including implementation research and power as applied in the 
study. Section four provides an overview of existing empirical evidence on implementation of 
strategic purchasing which is the focus of the study. The final section (four) summarizes the 
literature presented including gaps in literature and give relevant recommendations. 
 
SECTION 1: DESCRIPTION OF THE KENYAN CONTEXT 
 
 
Kenya is a low-income country located in East Africa with an estimated national population of 49 
Million in 2017 with an annual population growth rate of about one million people (World Bank 
Group, 2018a). Kenya’s economy is on the rebound in 2018 after slowed economic growth due to a 
prolonged electioneering period associated with political uncertainty in 2016 and 2017(World Bank 
Group, 2018a). 
Kenya’s GDP growth is expected to rise to 5.5% in 2018 and steadily to 6.1% in 2020 compared to a 
five year low of 4.8% in 2017 (World Bank Group, 2018a). Kenya’s GDP per capita was estimated at 
USD 1,440 in 2017 being the largest economy in the East African region serving as a regional 
economic hub (World Bank Group, 2018a). 
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Kenya’s current government has outlined 4 key priority areas for economic development for the 
political period ending 2022 that are dubbed ‘the big four’ that includes affordable housing, 
agriculture and food security, manufacturing and affordable health care for all (Government of 
Kenya, 2018). Because of the key goal of healthcare for all, the discourse on Universal Health 
Coverage (UHC) has received increased attention in Kenya. Additionally, the country seems to be 
back on the journey to achieving middle income status by year 2030, as per Kenya’s economic blue 
print-Vision 2030 (Government of Kenya, 2007). 
1.1 Social, economic and health indicators in Kenya 
 
Kenya’s economy is largely dependent on agriculture with a significant proportion of the population 
working in the agricultural and informal sectors. It is estimated that about 68 percent of people live 
in the rural areas and about 32 percent lives in urban areas (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 
2010a). The latter have better access to social amenities such as health, water, sanitation and 
education amongst others. Results from the last census, 2009 (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 
2010a) and the 2008 Kenya household Survey (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2006) revealed 
that approximately 49 percent of the population were poor and were living below the poverty line 
with almost half of them (19 percent) identified as indigents. Health indicators are relatively poor 
with infant mortality rate estimated at 29.4 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2016 which is more than 
15 times that of some developed nations (World Bank Group, 2018b). Maternal mortality is also 
comparatively high at 484 deaths per 100,000 live births which for example is more than 25 times 
that of the US (World Health Organization, 2013). Life expectancy in Kenya is still comparatively low 
although it has improved from 67 in 2000 to 71 in 2016(World Bank Group, 2018b). While 92% of 
pregnant mothers attend antenatal care, only approximately 43% deliver in a health facility (Kenya 
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National Bureau of Statistics, 2010b). Kenya also suffers from a high HIV burden. However there 
have been significant gains in lowering prevalence from about 10% in the mid-nineties to about 6.2 
percent in 2010. ARV coverage is also relatively high at 83.1 percent amongst eligible adults 
(National Aids Control Council, 2012). There has been a gradual increase in the incidence and 
prevalence of non-communicable diseases including cancers and cardiovascular illnesses that 
contributed to 28% of mortality (World Health Organization, 2013) which presents further 
challenges to the improvement of health outcomes. Thus, like most other developing countries the 
country is still faced with poor health outcomes despite making some gains in some health areas. 
1.2 Overview of healthcare provision in Kenya 
The Kenya health sector comprises a mixed public and private healthcare provision system. Public 
health services and facilities are organized in a tiered system and ranked on types and breadth of 
health services offered (Nyikuri et al., 2015). In 2010 following implementation of a new 
constitution, a devolved system of government composed of 47 independent and distinct 
administrative regions known as counties were established (Nyikuri et al., 2015). The counties 
manage all the lower level public facilities and provision of care that includes community health 
services, primary healthcare services and county referral services whilst national referral services are 
managed centrally by the Ministry of Health (Nyikuri et al., 2015). The private sector is composed of 
private for-profit, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and faith-based organization (FBO) 
facilities (Luoma et al., 2010). The private sector’s role in provision of care in Kenya is significant as 
about half of all facilities (primary and tertiary) in Kenya are privately owned (Deloitte, 2011).. A 
majority of the large and well-established private providers are found in urban areas whilst smaller 
providers are found in the rural areas and smaller towns owned by sole proprietors such as nurses or 
doctors (Barnes et al., 2010). 
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1.3 Overview of health financing in Kenya 
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines health financing as the “function of a health system 
that is concerned with mobilization, accumulation and allocation of money to cover the health 
needs of the people’’, the goal of a health financing system is ‘’to make funding available as well as 
to set the right financial incentives to providers to ensure that all individuals have access to effective 
public health and personal health care’’ (World Health Organization, 2000). There are three key 
functions of a health financing system, namely: revenue collection, pooling and purchasing with an 
overview of each provided below. 
1.3.1 Revenue collection in Kenya 
Revenue collection can be defined as the mechanisms by which health systems receive funds from 
households, organizations/companies or donor (World Health Organization, 2000). Revenue 
collection determines the amount of funds raised by a health system which then affects the type 
and amount of services that can be purchased. Revenue collection for health in Kenya is generated 
through: (1) various taxes and donor inflows to national and county governments, (2) member 
contributions to the National Health Insurance Fund, (3) member contributions to voluntary private 
insurance schemes and, (4) out-of-Pocket (OOP) expenditures at private and public facilities (Barasa 
et al., 2018, Chuma and Okungu, 2011). Public sources account for 37% of all total health 
expenditure (THE), whilst private sources accounted for 39.6% and donors 23.4% of THE in 2016 
(Government of Kenya, 2017).OOP expenditures in Kenya are relatively high and stood at 27.7% of 
THE in 2015/16 (Government of Kenya, 2017). Health inequities are said to exist when payments for 
health services are not matched to ability to pay and households are at risk of financial catastrophe 
as a resulting of seeking care (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2000). The high OOP levels in Kenya 
creates inequities in revenue collection in Kenya (Barasa et al., 2018, Chuma and Okungu, 2011). 
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Further, the NHIF contribution rates and overall revenue collection system in Kenya is largely 
regressive as payments for healthcare amongst the poor comprise of higher proportions of their 
income compared to the wealthier populations (Barasa et al., 2018, Chuma and Okungu, 2011). 
1.3.2 Pooling in Kenya 
 
Pooling can be defined as the accumulation and management of collected funds to ensure that the 
financial risk of seeking healthcare is shared by all the members of a given pool (World Health 
Organization, 2000). Pooling can enable efficient purchasing of healthcare resources when 
purchasers have large pools with sufficient risk and cross subsidization mechanisms (Figueras et al., 
2005). 
Kenya’s health financing system is characterized by limited pooling of health resources whereby 
existing pools are multiple, fragmented and have less than desirable risk and cross subsidization 
mechanisms (Munge et al., 2015). The NHIF forms the largest pool by membership size estimated 
to have 2.8 million principal members and 6.6 million lives covered which is approximately 17 % of 
the national population (Munge et al., 2017). 
The bulk of the NHIF contributors are formal sector employees due to the mandatory nature of the 
NHIF deductions from monthly salaries (Munge et al., 2017). Within the general NHIF pool, there 
are some segments of the population enjoying enhanced benefits such as access to private facilities 
and optical and dental covers. Examples of these include the civil servants medical scheme 
introduced in 2012 who are arguably not amongst the poor segments of the population hence 
promoting inequities (Barasa et al., 2018). Further, there is also limited cross subsidization as these 
pools have dedicated funds that other pools cannot draw from (Barasa et al., 2018, Chuma and 
Okungu, 2011). 
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Voluntary private medical schemes comprise the other pools within the Kenyan health financing 
system. These schemes cover about 700,000 people totaling to only about 2 percent of the Kenyan 
population who are mainly in formal sector and relatively wealthier (Munge et al., 2015). Income 
and risk cross subsidization is thus limited within these pools as they are inaccessible to lower 
income populations hence promoting further inequities in the overall health system in Kenya 
(Chuma and Okungu, 2011, Munge et al., 2015). 
The next voluntary pool is composed of the Community Based Health Insurance Schemes (CBHIS) 
targeting rural and low-income populations covering only 1.2 percent of the population – 
approximately 450,000 lives (Chuma and Okungu, 2011) 
Thus, pooling in Kenya is highly fragmented and characterized by low levels of risk and income cross 
subsidization, this is true in the public and private sector. The fragmentation is also reflected by the 
presence of multiple purchasers in the market with most having limited power to implement 
strategic purchasing mechanisms (Munge et al., 2015) as discussed below. 
 
1.3.4 Purchasing in Kenya 
 
WHO defines purchasing as the process through which funds are paid to providers in exchange for 
a set of health interventions (World Health Organization, 2000). Purchasing involves determining 
what kind of health services (benefit packages) people are entitled to from a given pool, how people 
will access these services – as well as how providers will be paid for providing care (Kutzin, 2001). 
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This function determines not only how pooled health resources are used but also overall efficiency 
of resource utilization. 
There are various organizations that serve the role of purchaser which frequently also handle 
pooling. Thus, understanding the organization and characteristics of healthcare purchasers can be 
the first step in outlining healthcare purchasing for a given country. Kutzin (2001) outlines two broad 
ways of describing and analysing health care purchasers within a health system: 
a) The market structures of the purchasing organizations as follows: whether there is a single 
payer or multiple payers; whether purchasers compete for market share; and whether in the 
public sector there is an organizational unit with explicit responsibility for purchasing of 
healthcare services, 
b) Their influence over provision of care, which can be described by whether they are passive 
purchasers or if they use their financial power to promote improved efficiency and quality 
of care. 
Additionally, it is also important to identify what services they buy, which providers they buy them 
from, for which population segments they buy the services for, how they pay providers, and how 
much they pay providers (Busse et al., 2007, Preker et al., 2007). 
Health care purchasing institutions in Kenya can be grouped as public and private. The NHIF is the 
sole public purchaser in Kenya (with several pools in the NHIF) whilst private purchasers include 
private health insurance firms and Community Based Health Insurance Schemes (CBHIs). 
1.3.4.1 Public purchaser-NHIF 
Kenya has a single national public purchaser known as the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) 
established in 1966 as a department within the Ministry of Health and currently receives its mandate 
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from the NHIF Act no 9 of 1998 (The National Hospital Insurance Fund Act No. 9 of 1998, 1998). The 
NHIF has the largest single pool by membership size in Kenya. The NHIF benefit package for all the 
members includes comprehensive cover for inpatient care at all public facilities and partial inpatient 
cover at select mission hospitals (National Hospital Insurance Fund, 2013). Over recent years the 
NHIF has expanded its benefit package for the general population to include outpatient medical care 
at private and public facilities managed through a capitation model and through FFS methods 
offered cover for cancer care including chemotherapy and radiotherapy services at private and 
public facilities, and minor and major surgery at public and private facilities and dialysis (National 
Hospital Insurance Fund, 2015, Munge et al., 2015, Abuya et al., 2015). The NHIF benefit package 
differs for various beneficiaries with some schemes such as civil servants having wider benefit 
packages than the general population (Abuya et al., 2015, Chuma and Okungu, 2011). 
The NHIF has undergone various reforms including review of its provider payments system. In the 
past, NHIF only used fee-for-service for inpatient care whereby providers would be paid a fixed 
rebate pegged on number of days a patient was admitted (Chuma and Okungu, 2011). Overtime 
additional provider payments mechanisms have been introduced such as: (1) capitation for 
provision of outpatient care; (2) fee-for-service for some pools that have inpatient, outpatient 
dental and optical services covered; (3) case-based fixed payments for special packages such as: 
maternity, renal dialysis, surgery and chemotherapy, radiotherapy and radiology (Barasa et al., 
2018). The NHIF purchasing of health services has evolved over time with introductions of other 
 
purchasing reforms such as adoption of quality assurance mechanisms across its provider network 
through the Kenya Quality Model for Health (KQMH1), and contracting of more providers through
 
                                                            
1 KQMH is a conceptual framework for an integrated approach to improved quality of healthcare launched by the Ministry of Health in 2012. KQMH is underpinned by three 
approaches namely, evidence-based medicine, total quality management, and patient partnerships. Evidence based medicine supports development, dissemination and application 
of standards and guidelines. Total quality management involves use of quality improvement principles, use of master checklists enabling adherence to standards and guidelines. 
Patient Partnership involves ensuring community participation and involvement in health matters and decision-making processes. The framework uses a checklist to ‘score’ 
performance of an organization against established standards (Ministry of Medical Services & Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation, 2011) 
11  
selective accreditation whereby NHIF accredited providers by segmenting them into various levels 
of care based on the capacity of the provider to provide the services required for the different levels 
(Ministry of Medical Services & Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation, 2011). 
In 2015, the NHIF introduced capitation when rolling out outpatient medical cover for all its 
beneficiaries, whereby providers are paid KES. 1,200 to 1,400 (approx. USD 12-14) per annum per 
member (Abuya et al., 2015). The payment is paid in advance to providers in four equal quarterly 
instalments based on number of beneficiaries allocated to providers who have adopted capitation. 
NHIF lists the outpatient services covered to include the following: consultation; treatment; basic 
diagnostic tests including laboratory and X-ray; day care surgery; and drugs under the Kenya 
Essential Drug List of 2010 (Barasa et al., 2018, Chuma and Okungu, 2011, National Hospital 
Insurance Fund, 2015). 
1.3.4.2 Private purchasers 
Non-state healthcare purchasing institutions in Kenya can be grouped as follows: private health 
insurance firms, health micro-insurance providers and Community Based Health Insurance Funds 
(CBHIs). Private health insurance firms further tend to classify themselves as either underwriters or 
as medical insurance providers (MIPs)-the latter equivalent to managed care organizations 
(Deloitte, 2011a). 
In 2016 there were 40 private health insurance firms composed of 19 underwriters and 31 medical 
insurance providers (Association of Kenya Insurers (AKI), 2017) whose health insurance coverage 
totals to only about 3 percent of the Kenyan population (Barasa et al., 2018, Chuma and Okungu, 
2011). Most of those covered by these schemes are in the formal private sector and live in urban 
areas. The schemes are highly fragmented with the largest pools averaging only about 100,000 lives 
covered and characterized by limited risk cross subsidization (Deloitte, 2011). In regard to 
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healthcare purchasing, they tend to offer mainly inpatient services with relatively wide and 
comprehensive benefits that allow access to most of the leading private healthcare facilities in the 
country (Munge et al., 2015). Benefit packages vary significantly across different pools as they are 
largely pegged on ability to pay for stated premiums (Chuma and Okungu, 2011, Munge et al., 2015). 
Fee-for-service (FFS) is the main provider payment mechanism used and has been associated with 
the poor financial performance of most insurers. Some of the consequences of FFS recorded in 
Kenya include provider over servicing, high administration costs and low incentives for promotion 
of preventative care over curative services (Deloitte, 2011, Munge et al., 2015). Further, most 
schemes are characterized by high claims loss ratios (claims incurred as a fraction of total gross 
premiums received by insurers) resulting in poor profitability (Association of Kenya Insurers (AKI), 
2017, Munge et al., 2015).The high claim loss ratios have been attributed to various factors such as 
a high rate of medical inflation and private insurers having weak bargaining power compared to the 
major providers in the country (Association of Kenya Insurers (AKI), 2017, Munge et al., 2015). This 
poor financial performance has led to a number of private purchasers introducing various strategic 
purchasing mechanisms as a way of managing costs, improving sustainability and as part of quality 
assurance processes. These mechanisms include: hiring staff with a medical background that include 
case managers and medical managers; intervening in clinical decision-making processes; and the 
introduction of preauthorization processes for various services such as specialist care and referral 
services (Munge et al., 2015, Deloitte, 2011). 
Despite having made some improvements in health outcomes over the last few years, Kenya’s 
health system is still weak. There is renewed government focus on achieving UHC which provides 
an opportunity for addressing some of the weaknesses in the health financing system such as 
inequities in revenue generation, fragmented pooling systems and weak purchasing systems. As 
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mentioned, private purchasers in Kenya have made efforts to implement different strategic 
purchasing mechanisms to control costs and improve on quality of care. 
 
SECTION 2: OVERVIEW OF STRATEGIC PURCHASING AND RELATED 
CONCEPTS 
 
Strategic purchasing involves the process of continuously searching for the best ways to maximize 
health system performance by purchasers making decisions on which interventions to purchase, 
how, and from whom to purchase them. Purchasers are also actively involved in selective 
contracting of providers and design of incentive schemes that in order to maximize value for 
individuals and the population (World Health Organization, 2000). 
2.1 Strategic purchasing and achievement of UHC 
 
There is evidence that implementing strategic purchasing mechanisms can aid policy makers in 
ensuring that provider actions and objectives are aligned with the interests of both purchasers and 
patients and ultimately achievement of UHC (Lagomarsino et al., 2012, Tangcharoensathien et al., 
2014, Xu et al., 2015). Towards this goal, Figueras et al. (2005) describes purchasing as a vital 
mechanism that safeguards three public interests within a national health system: quality, 
accessibility and affordability. They cite examples from France and Spain where purchasers use 
contracts that place significant emphasis on quality of care. Additionally, proper stewardship of the 
purchasing function is critical in promoting equity in access to care. Examples exist of purchasers in 
European countries using innovative provider payment mechanisms such as Diagnostic Related 
Groupings (DRGs) to lower costs of care such as in Spain, the United Kingdom and Czech (Figueras 
et al., 2005). It is advised that countries should adopt strategic purchasing mechanisms to achieve 
the goals of UHC (World Health Organization, 2010, Reich et al., 2016, McKee and Brand, 2005). 
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Strategic purchasing mechanisms can be categorized as follows (Kutzin, 2001): 
a) financial incentives and provider payment methods which may either transfer some of the 
financial risk for providing care to providers; 
b) having a pre-selected panel of providers whereby only services provided by such are eligible 
for reimbursement by purchasers; 
c) selective contracting with specific providers with negotiated fee schedules and specified 
utilization controls; 
d) managing accredited providers through various monitoring mechanisms and possible 
sanctions based on treatment, referral, prescribing and cost control behaviors; 
e) purchaser interventions in clinical decision-making processes to check inappropriate care 
and improve quality through mechanisms such as, pre-authorization of elective admissions, 
and; 
f) promoting use of standard treatment protocols to improve standardization. 
 
These mechanisms hold great potential in improving resource optimization and helping purchasers 
overcome some of the health market inefficiencies favouring providers. Although this study does 
not apply the principal-agent framework it is an important concept in healthcare purchasing related 
to the study’s focus on provider-purchaser relationships as briefly outlined below. 
2.2. Principal-Agent Theory 
 
A principal can be defined as a party wishing to secure provision of given goods or services but lacks 
the necessary specialized knowledge, skills or assets and hence has to contract an agent to 
undertake this task (Figueras et al., 2005). In this study providers are procured by purchasers as 
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agents to provide care to the purchasers’ clients as outlined by Figueras (2005). 
Principal-agent relationships are never perfect leading to problems due to various factors such as: 
the possibility of opportunistic behaviour of the agent that is often not in the best interest of the 
principal (Preker et al., 2007); presence of information asymmetry between purchasers and 
providers; self-interest behaviours of providers e.g. supplier-induced demand; and existing 
differential powers between agents and providers (Jan et al., 2005). Notably most of these factors 
favor agents over the principal and shift some power to the agent relative to the principal. These 
realities then call for the need to create incentives within contracts and provider payment 
mechanisms to better align the goals of providers, purchasers and patients (Pontes, 1995, Preker et 
al., 2007, Robinson, 2001). 
Several key policy areas have been noted as important for policy makers to consider during the 
design and implementation of health financing reforms aimed at achievement of UHC including the 
benefit package design; mixed provider payment methods; governance; information management 
systems; management of stakeholder alignment and dynamics and sequencing of broader 
healthcare reforms (Mathauer et al., 2017). Provider payments mechanisms are a common 
approach to strategic purchasing, hence the next part deals with this in some detail. It should 
however be clear from above that provider payment mechanisms are not the only strategic 
purchasing mechanisms in the tool box available to purchasers. 
Introduction of innovative prospective provider payment methods such as capitation is an 
important part of implementation of strategic purchasing. Shifting of some of the risks of providing 
care from purchasers to providers is an integral part of implementation of strategic purchasing.  
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2.3 Provider payment mechanisms 
 
Provider payment mechanisms can be defined as the methods and mechanisms used to transfer 
resources to providers (Kutzin, 2001). These mechanisms can be used to promote desired health 
outcomes and goals by designing them to generate different economic signals and incentives that 
influence provider behaviours (Langenbrunner et al., 2005). Provider payment mechanisms can be 
classified as follows (Lagarde et al., 2010): 
a. Retrospective: such as salaries and fee-for service 
 
b. Prospective: such as budgeting, capitation and case-based payments. 
 
Retrospective payment methods are whereby payment rates are set after services are offered and 
are prone to escalation of costs by providers compared to prospective payment methods whereby 
payments rates are set prior to provision of care (Lagarde et al., 2010). An important part of strategic 
purchasing includes provider payment reforms whereby introduction of prospective payment 
mechanisms is seen to improve efficiency by shifting some of the costs of providing care from 
purchasers to providers. 
 
Capitation can be defined as payment rates to providers that are set prospectively to provide a 
defined package of care at a fixed sum per person enrolled with a provider for a defined period of 
time (World Health Organization, 2010). The amount paid within the agreed duration of time is 
usually based on the number of patients assigned to a provider and is not directly linked to the 
quantity of services offered by the provider (World Health Organization, 2010, Figueras et al., 2005). 
Capitation transfers the financial risk of providing care from purchasers to providers and incentivizes 
providers to be more efficient in resource utilization (Lagarde et al., 2010). However capitation may 
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also lead to negative provider behaviors such as excessive referrals of patients requiring expensive 
treatments, under provision of care (under-servicing) as well as a tendency to avoid less healthier 
and elderly patients in preference for those who are less likely to fall ill e.g. younger members 
(cream skimming) in order to maximize profits (Lagarde et al., 2010). However, to control these 
potential pitfalls, capitation models will normally have controls such as restrictions on referral 
mechanisms, enforcement of audits and implementation of different quality assurance mechanisms 
(Goldstein, 1996). 
Key to implementation of capitation as well as any other provider payment method is the 
achievement of consensus between providers and insurers on payment rates per patient to ensure 
interests of both parties as well as patients are catered for (Langenbrunner et al., 2005, Lagarde et 
al., 2010, Kazungu et al., 2018, Goldstein, 1996). 
2.4 Overview of interventions in clinical-decision making by purchasers 
 
Purchasers in a bid to control costs of care and improve quality frequently get involved in directly 
or indirectly influencing the clinical-decision making processes of providers in a variety of ways 
(Kutzin, 2001). Hajjaj et al. (2010) define clinical decision-making in health as the process that 
clinicians undertake to make an informed judgment and choice about the treatment necessary for 
their patients. They further note that amongst the factors that influence decision making includes 
interventions by purchasers and policies set by purchasers to influence provider behaviors (Hajjaj et 
al., 2010). One such documented intervention relevant to this study includes use of 
preauthorizations and is briefly outlined below. 
Preauthorization for specified services: Insurers may control costs and utilization of certain services 
by requiring providers to seek some form of approval from them before offering the services to 
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clients. Hence these authorizations commonly known as preauthorization are considered as a form 
of strategic purchasing (Kutzin, 2001). Such authorizations are common place and could be given 
over telephone calls, emails or in written form (Hansen et al., 2006). In the US, this is common and 
is even backed by laws enabling Medicaid (the government’s social health care insurance program 
for low income citizens) to implement (Delate et al., 2005). There is evidence of pre-authorization 
mechanisms lowering cost of care without affecting health outcomes such as in its use by Medicaid 
for rationalizing use of proton pump inhibitors (anti-ulcers drugs) (Delate et al., 2005). However, 
there is also evidence that complying with multiple preauthorization requirements was costly and 
cumbersome to physicians in the US (Casalino et al., 2009). 
2.3 Use of contracts and role of information asymmetry 
As individuals and organizations specialize and exchange of goods and services occurs, agreements 
(contracts) are required to coordinate the resultant transactions through specifying each party’s 
obligation. However, contracts are not without their limitations and they may not always be 
enforceable or verifiable (Figueras et al., 2005) as organizations and individuals (providers and 
purchasers included) are still opportunistic even amidst contracts (Preker et al., 2007). Contracts are 
also considered to be incomplete as individuals are limited in the amount of information they can 
understand and process, as well as the time with which to make a decision (Simon, 1997). This is 
typical in health systems whereby information asymmetries exist between purchasers and providers 
(Donaldson, 1995). Providers will thus tend to take advantage of the information asymmetry faced 
by purchasers (Donaldson, 1995) whilst purchasers will commonly use contracts to overcome 
information asymmetry and gain some power over providers (Kutzin, 2001). 
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SECTION 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMING, IMPLEMENTATION AND POWER 
 
 
This section provides insight into the key concepts and lenses used in the study, to firstly understand 
how the strategic purchasing function can shift the risk of health care costs to the provider and then 
considers the key concept of implementation, as the study is concerned with how different source 
of power for purchasers and providers may be used to either influence or resist the implementation 
of strategic purchasing mechanisms in practice. 
 
 
3.1 Conceptual framing: distributing the risk of health care costs 
 
This study firstly considers a conceptual framework (Figure 1 below) introduced in the World 
Health Report 1999 that outlines how different types of provider payment mechanisms and 
financing schemes distribute the risk of health care costs across various parties such as individuals, 
purchasers, governments, and providers (World Health Organization, 1999) as a starting point for 
thinking about the relationship between the purchaser and provider. 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
The framework is based on the premise that prospective payment methods (such as budgets and 
capitated payments) are more effective in transferring the financial risk of providing care from 
purchasers to providers as compared to retrospective payment methods such as fee-for-service 
(World Health Organization, 1999).The transfer of risk is an important component in strategic 
purchasing because purchasers are then able to predict and lower costs of care, incentivize 
providers to be more efficient, and maximize value for limited funds by covering more people with 
more services (Lagarde et al., 2010, Mathauer et al., 2017, McKee and Brand, 2005, Robinson, 2001, 
World Health Organization, 2000, World Health Organization, 2010). On the bottom left segment, 
whereby the simplest payment methods are assumed, the patient carries all the financial risk as the 
patient pays the providers the full amounts for care provided. As you move to the right, the risks 
are spread to other third parties with purchasers (shown at the apex) bearing some of the risks, for 
example in the diagram the private insurers, governments and social security organizations involved 
now take up some of the risks of providing care on behalf of the individuals they cover. This is 
typically where the purchaser reimburses providers for providing care to a group of people covered 
Figure 1 Impact of different financing schemes and provider payment methods on bearing the financial 
risks of providing care 
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by the purchaser. These payments are usually largely retrospective and are commonly from general 
tax-funded national health systems and payroll tax-funded social health insurance systems as well 
as voluntary private health insurance schemes. As you move further to the right, prospective 
payment methods such as capitation are introduced whereby providers increasingly bear some of 
the risks. 
3.1.1. The modified conceptual framework 
 
 
This conceptual framework has been modified (Figure 2) for this study, we have now included 
additional strategic purchasing mechanisms in the framework that purchasers can also use to shift 
the risk of providing care to providers (Kutzin, 2001). This includes the use of contracts to selectively 
accredit providers, intervening in clinical decision-making processes, negotiating prices of care with 
providers, use of preauthorization processes, hiring staff with medical knowledge and use of step– 
down procedures. This is done in recognition that provider payment mechanisms are not the only 
mechanisms in the strategic purchasing tool box. 
The implementation of change can be difficult, when a purchaser is seeking to increase the risk 
borne by providers this can result in challenges during implementation. Kutzin (2001) identifies the 
use of power as a mechanism in the implementation of change, “a critical factor for the performance 
of health care systems is the extent to which purchasers use their financial power actively to 
encourage providers to pursue efficiency and quality in service delivery”. Busse et al. (2007) note 
that the introduction of strategic purchasing mechanisms introduces new power balances and 
“responses might be positive or negative depending on whether providers see the introduction of 
strategic purchasing mechanisms as an opportunity or a threat”. 
For this reason, the framework has also been modified to include sources of power for purchasers 
22  
and providers as identified in literature; Kutzin (2001) and Pauly (1998) identify the sources of power 
for purchasers as; institutional regulatory authority2; prospective provider payment mechanisms 
such as capitation; having a market monopsony3 with a higher bargaining authority2 over providers. 
Sources of power for providers include; having a market monopoly3 and hence a higher bargaining 
capacity4 over purchasers; retrospective provider payment methods such as fee-for-service; and the 
presence of information asymmetry is a source of power for providers (Kutzin, 2001, Pauly, 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
2 Having institutional regulatory authority and hence high bargaining authority means that a purchaser 
has: authority to negotiate with providers about the expected quantity, quality, and availability of the 
interventions to be purchased and provided; ability to set and enforce the rules of the game; and 
responsibility of providing strategic direction for all the different actors involved 
 
3 Purchasers can be said to have market monopsony power in a market when they are the only buyer in 
a market with multiple competing providers and are able to use their financial power to ensure that 
service delivery occurs in line with the objectives of efficiency and high quality 
 
4 Providers are said to have market monopoly and hence higher bargaining capacity when there are few health 
providers controlling a significant market share that enables them to dictate prices and influence decision making in 
relation to cost, quality of care and type and quantity of interventions to be provided 
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Figure 2 Conceptual framework showing how providers and purchasers use their various sources of power 
to influence outcomes of implementation of various strategic purchasing mechanisms 
 
 
 
3.2 Overview of the concept of implementation 
 
Implementation research is a relatively new field in public health and medical research (Erasmus et 
al., 2014). It is a field suited for researchers who aim to understand the ‘what, why’, and how’ new 
interventions work in the “real world” setting with a goal of exploring approaches on how best to 
improve on them (Peters et al., 2013). It is defined as “the scientific enquiry into questions 
concerning implementation—the act of carrying an intention into effect, which in health research 
can be policies, programs, or individual practices (collectively called interventions)” (Peters et al., 
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2013). It can be applied to support implementation of health strategies and interventions by 
enabling the evaluation of implementation outcomes. 
Implementation outcomes are the outcomes of implementation, outcome ‘variables’ include the 
following: acceptability, adoption, appropriateness, feasibility, fidelity, implementation cost, 
coverage and sustainability (Peters et al., 2013). Two of these outcomes (adoption and acceptability) 
that are of interest in answering our research question are defined as follows (Peters et al., 2013): 
• Acceptability is defined as the perception amongst stakeholders of a given intervention and the 
extent to which the intervention is agreeable to them. These stakeholders could include 
consumers, managers, policy makers, providers as well as purchasers; 
• Adoption is defined as the intention, initial decision or action to try to employ a new 
intervention. The degree and level of uptake and utilization of a given intervention by 
stakeholders is also viewed as a component of adoption. 
In this study implementation is understood through the lens of the acceptability and adoption of 
the strategic purchasing mechanism as these concepts represent implementation outcomes. When 
studying implementation, researchers should also be cognizant of the fact that implementation 
does not happen at once but in stages and will most likely not happen smoothly (Fixsen et al., 2005). 
Bhattacharyya, Reeves & Zwarenstein (2009) note that despite the existence of a large number of 
systematic reviews of implementation interventions, most of the fundamental questions regarding 
what approaches should be used in which settings and for which problems remain unanswered 
(Bhattacharyya et al., 2009). 
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3.3 Overview of the concept of power 
Literature in political science defines power as a relationship between two people (or parties) 
whereby person A is said to have power over person B to the extent that A can get B to do something 
that B would not have otherwise done (Dahl, 1957). Although Dahl (1957) uses mathematical 
reasoning to further express this definition, he still acknowledges that it is quite difficult to come up 
with a firm definition of power as power is an intuitive phenomenon. Walt and Gilson (1994) and 
Erasmus and Gilson (2008) agree that the influence of power is evident, has an unquestionable role 
in health policy, and is at the heart of health policy. They also note that ironically, it is startlingly 
seldom considered in the health policy implementation literature for LMIC (Erasmus and Gilson, 
2008, Walt and Gilson, 1994). There is also limited literature on this concept and its role in 
implementation of strategic purchasing mechanisms. 
In summary, purchasers will use contracts as per principal-agent theory to overcome the effects of 
information asymmetry between them and providers, ultimately shifting risk. Shifting from passive 
to strategic purchasing is documented to accelerate achievement of UHC (World Health 
Organization, 2010, Reich et al., 2016, McKee and Brand, 2005). Purchasers may use their various 
sources of power to influence the acceptability and/or adoption of a strategic purchasing 
mechanism. Providers may find a strategic purchasing mechanism unacceptable and resist adoption 
of the mechanism. Implementation research is relatively new in health research but its application 
in strategic purchasing may yield valuable insights for policy makers on the how to of strategic 
purchasing. 
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SECTION 4: OVERVIEW OF EXISTING EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC PURCHASING 
 
 
4.1 Evidence on provider adoption and acceptability of strategic purchasing 
 
 
While still limited, there is a growing body of empirical evidence on the implementation of strategic 
purchasing mechanisms. The available studies point to mixed reactions by providers to 
implementation, these reactions are driven by economic and non-economic considerations. 
It is well documented that a number of low and middle income nations have implemented shifts 
from FFS payment methods to capitation. (Mills et al., 2000). In the UK there has also been a shift 
from using salaries to pay general physicians to capitation based payments (Figueras, Robinson & 
Jakubowski, 2005). The available studies point to mixed reactions by providers to implementation. 
For example, whilst introduction of prospective global budgets in Europe was associated with 
providers offering more preventative care, it was also associated with under provision of services 
by avoiding offering expensive services (Jegers et al., 2002). Fee for service payments on the other 
hand promoted longer hospital stays amongst providers in Europe (Cylus & Irwin, 2010). 
 
Under capitation, the capitation rate has often been found to be not acceptable to providers, hence 
influencing decisions to adopt or not. A study carried out in 2010 in one state in Nigeria showed that 
93% of the public and private providers included in the study felt that the capitation rates offered 
per enrolee by the national social insurance were too low for them to provide quality care and 
maintain their operations sustainability (Robyn et al., 2012). A study focusing on the response of 
providers to implementation of capitation in Thailand found that providers initially deemed the 
capitation rates too low and were apprehensive (Mills et al., 2000). However, after realizing that 
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they could enrol more healthy adults the rates were viewed more favourably. 
Evidence from Ghana and Kenya shows that providers consider various economic factors when 
deciding whether or not to enroll with social insurance schemes as follows: popularity of the scheme 
with the citizens hence the potential for higher revenues; pressure from existing clients; and 
potential for consistent cashflow (Sieverding et al., 2018). Similarly, an assessment in Rwanda on 
the impact of implementation of pay-for-performance mechanisms revealed that providers focused 
more on services that had higher payment rates such as delivery but with less focus given to services 
with lower payment rates such as immunization (Basinga et al., 2011). The payment rate is thus an 
important economic factor considered by providers that affects firstly the acceptability and 
ultimately the full adoption of a given strategic purchasing mechanism. 
 
 
Other economic factors identified in literature that promote provider acceptance and adoption of 
different strategic purchasing mechanisms include: models with timely payments to providers 
(Mohammed et al., 2014, Agyepong and Nagai, 2011); and shorter payment schedules in 
comparison to longer ones such as quarterly payments were preferred to annual payments (Robyn 
et al., 2012). 
A study looking at the determinants of provider acceptance of the introduction of capitation 
payments amongst dentists in the USA found that larger practices were more likely to accept 
capitation payment as they could bear the actuarial risks involved compared to smaller practices 
(Conrad et al., 2009). Practices charging relatively higher fees were however more likely to resist 
capitation compared to those charging lower fees (Conrad et al., 2009). 
There are also non-economic considerations by providers. For example, providers prefer capitation 
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models with existing feedback mechanisms as part of monitoring and quality assurance (Olafsdottir 
et al., 2014). Additionally, providers also value inclusion of quality assessment mechanisms that also 
factor in overall facility performance as it is difficult to assess quality of care objectively from 
individual health care worker performance assessments (Agyepong et al., 2014). A study in Tanzania 
identified that healthcare workers were concerned about lack of resources, poor availability of 
supplies and unfavourable community preferences in relation to implementation of pay-for-
performance models. (Olafsdottir et al., 2014). A study on implementation of capitation in Ghana 
showed that majority of the providers felt that the choice to pilot capitation in a region known as 
Ashanti was ill advised as some clients associated the region’s political affiliations to the capitation 
model leading to misconceptions about the capitation model (Agyei-Baffour et al., 2013). 
Very recent literature from Kenya also provides some evidence on provider acceptance and 
adoption of strategic purchasing. A paper focusing on experiences of providers with capitation and 
FFS payment methods found that most of the providers surveyed felt that the NHIF capitation rates 
were low and needed to be revised upwards (Obadha et al., 2018). Further, providers favored FFS 
models implemented by private purchasers and the NHIF as the expected revenues were more 
predictable compared to capitation models implemented by the NHIF as providers had limited 
knowledge on the number of enrolees allocated to them (Obadha et al., 2018). Some of these 
provider perceptions and experiences could be due to poor planning and implementation of 
provider payment methods by purchasers as was noted to be the case with the NHIF whereby 
another recent study notes that there was little involvement of providers in the design and pricing 
of the NHIF capitation model (Munge et al., 2017). For improved provider adoption and acceptance 
of strategic purchasing mechanisms, purchasers should thus ensure that there are sufficient 
mechanisms (such as provider and patient feedback processes to the purchaser) put in place to 
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allow continuous improvements and reforms during implementation of new and existing strategic 
purchasing mechanisms (Obadha et al., 2018, Sieverding et al., 2018). 
 
4.2 Evidence on the role of power in implementation 
 
Some studies focused on strategic purchasing provide some insight into the influence of purchaser 
and provider power on outcomes of implementation as outlined below. 
Munge, et. al (2018) in a recent assessment of the NHIF noted that NHIF uses regulation authority 
as a source of power over providers through accreditation and de-gazettement of providers based 
on the standards set by the NHIF. The NHIF has the power to accredit providers as well as to de- 
gazette providers based on standards set by the NHIF (Munge, et. al, 2018), they thus have 
regulatory authority as a source of power over providers. 
The NHIF also uses its hired quality assurance officers and medical officers (Munge et al., 2015) as 
part of strategic purchasing efforts aimed at overcoming information asymmetry enabling the NHIF 
to ensure that set standards are clearly met. In Iran purchasers used various mandatory regulations 
governing providers’ behavior as a source of power to influence provider adoption and acceptability 
of the mechanisms (Gorji et al., 2018). Ginsburg (2010) reported that several states whilst 
purchasing health services in the US adopted a regulatory approach in the 1970s and 1980s to limit 
the rates payable to providers in reaction to growing provider power (Ginsburg, 2010). 
It is not only provider payment mechanisms that can be used to control costs, other strategic 
purchasing mechanisms can also be effective. In Nigeria, the social purchaser implemented a 
preauthorization processes as a strategic purchasing mechanism to manage referrals of patients 
(Ibe et al., 2017). 
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Ghoddoosi-Nezhad et al (2017) note that large purchasers can use their size to take advantage of 
economies of scale and better bargaining capacity (monopsony power) to deal with natural 
monopolies that providers frequently enjoy. These provides can use their monopsony power to 
influence provider costs as well as quality of care provided (Ghoddoosi-Nezhad et al., 2017). Pauly 
(1998) reported that purchasers with significant monopsony in the USA were able to use their 
market power to reduce medical costs as they were able to negotiate for lower prices from the 
providers. Kutzin (2001) adds that market share can be a potential source of power for purchasers 
in a ‘single payer’ setting as the purchaser has monopsony over the providers. Kutzin (2001) further 
notes that this power may be used by insurers to effectively lower provider costs and to even 
promote improved quality and efficiency amongst providers. However, there may also be negative 
consequences in instances where there is minimal competition for purchasers to the detriment of 
providers and insurers. For example, such monopsony has led to many of the health insurance 
companies in Latin America having a lot of bureaucracy due to lack of competition (Kutzin, 2001). 
Kutzin (2001) further argues that supply side focused interventions such as provider payment 
methods are more effective policy tools than those focused on the demand side and thus the extent 
to which purchasers use their financial power to influence provider behavior is critical to the success 
of a health financing system. 
In addition to financial and regulatory power, purchasers can also use other mechanisms to exercise 
their power over providers such as contracts that guide providers to set practices; as well as 
intervening in clinical care amongst other interventions (Kutzin, 2001). 
There are various sources of power for providers found in literature. Munge et. al (2018) noted that 
private providers in Kenya can use their monopoly as a source of power to dictate prices of services 
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to private purchasers. Private providers in Kenya are also documented to wield significant power 
through creation of powerful interest groups active in the health making processes (Barasa et., al 
2018). A recent review of strategic purchasing across 10 European countries noted that providers in 
France and Germany used their professional and provider unions as a source of power to influence 
decision making around deployment of human resources across various public hospitals (Klasa et 
al., 2018). 
In addition to power dynamics between providers and purchasers, there are also other factors that 
can influence implementation of strategic purchasing such as the extent of the provider-purchaser 
split (Docteur and Oxley, 2003) and tensions between technical and political considerations (Koduah 
et al., 2016). A recent study notes that in order to support implementation of strategic purchasing, 
policy makers should strive to create powerful, autonomous purchasers that have the legal 
mandate, data, and economic power needed to implement strategic purchasing (Klasa et al., 2018). 
Evidence from Ghana shows that policy makers need to ensure that purchasing reforms are 
managed from a holistic systems perspective rather than linear perspectives, as the latter fails to 
account for the effects of existing context and stakeholder dynamics (Agyepong et al., 2014). 
Availability of an enabling regulatory framework and governance structure is also important (Reich 
et al., 2016, Langenbrunner et al., 2009, Kutzin et al., 2010). Additionally, policy makers should also 
ensure that challenges of the other health system functions and more so stewardship and 
governance of health systems should not be ignored during implementation (Ghoddoosi-Nezhad et 
al., 2017). 
In summary thus, although there is somewhat limited research on the role of provider and purchaser 
sources of power in influencing the implementation outcomes of strategic purchasing mechanisms, 
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the few existing studies done show that these sources of power indeed have an influence on 
implementation and should not be overlooked. However there have been few implementation 
research studies focused mainly on implementation outcomes of the various ongoing health finance 
reforms that include purchasing reforms. More implementation research studies are needed to 
build the knowledge base on strategic purchasing and moreover, the need for further research on 
the concept of power has also been identified to help health policy makers in LMICs better engage 
with the nature of reform (Erasmus & Gilson, 2008). Therefore, this research seeks to contribute to 
this knowledge base. 
 
 
SECTION 5: CONCLUSION 
 
 
Health care purchasing is not only an integral part of health financing systems but of overall health 
systems. In Kenya there is a growing body of research that not only documents the health system 
but also the health financing landscape. Although there have been major gains in improving health 
outcomes in the country, there is a wide body of literature that points out that a lot remains to be 
done especially in strengthening the health financing system. 
Health outcomes in Kenya are poor with examples of life expectancy and maternal mortality rates 
being undesirable because of an overburdened public health system. The health financing system is 
also weak. Total funds mobilized are insufficient and revenue collection is not equitable. Pooling is 
fragmented and characterized by low levels of both income and risk cross subsidization. There are 
two main groups of purchasers: the NHIF and private purchasers. The NHIF has introduced 
mechanisms to try and improve its purchasing functions by introducing strategic purchasing 
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mechanisms such as capitation-based payment methods and is making moves to shift away from 
FFS. However, it is still faced with major challenges including acceptability of capitation amongst 
providers, lack of accountability as well as insufficient revenue generation (Barasa et., al 2018). 
Private purchasers in the country are numerous resulting in fragmented pools (Munge, et al., 2018). 
These factors in addition to providers having various sources of power such as a monopoly and high 
bargaining capacity serve as limitations to their efforts to implement strategic purchasing 
mechanisms (Munge, et al., 2018). Some of these mechanisms include hiring staff with medical 
knowledge, use of preauthorization processes, selective contracting of providers and intervening in 
medical decision-making processes (Deloitte, 2011, Munge et al., 2015). 
Various economic theories and concepts of healthcare purchasing are applied in this study and are 
important in understanding some of the nuances around implementation of strategic purchasing. 
Examples the use of contracts to overcome information asymmetry, principal-agent theory, the vital 
role of strategic purchasing in achievement of UHC and the role of power. 
The conceptual framework used outlines that providers will use their various sources of power to 
resist adoption and acceptance of strategic purchasing mechanisms that they perceive shift too 
much of the risk of providing care to them. Purchasers on the other hand will use their sources of 
power to promote provider adoption and acceptance of these mechanisms. 
In regard to empirical evidence on implementation of strategic purchasing, there is a growing 
number of studies emerging from Sub-Sahara Africa including Kenya and the surrounding countries 
(with a number of studies on experiences from Ghana’s national health insurance scheme) available. 
However, there are still limited studies on role of various sources of power for providers and 
purchasers in influencing implementation outcomes. As such there is limited information to what 
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extent purchasers can use their sources of power to influence provider adoption and acceptance of 
various strategic mechanisms in a way that still ensures that this is a good relationship between 
providers and purchasers to support successful implementation. Additionally, there is limited 
knowledge on how purchasers can respond to providers using their various sources of power to 
resist implementation. 
Whilst no two contexts can be fully similar, there is need for more studies within Sub-Sahara Africa 
to support policy makers not only in generating contextual insights but to also aid in sharing of 
experiences in the region. Such research has the potential to not only inform stakeholder and policy 
implementers on how to effectively implement policies and promote efficiency but also on how to 
use the limited resources available to accelerate progress towards universal health coverage. 
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Abstract 
 
Background: Strategic purchasing can play a critical role in supporting the achievement of 
Universal Health Coverage by promoting efficiency. Purchasers in Kenya have implemented 
various strategic purchasing mechanisms with varied outcomes but there is limited 
knowledge on implementation from purchasers and providers perspectives. Whilst 
purchasers may use their power to promote implementation, providers may use their power 
to resist implementation. This study documents the role of power in influencing 
implementation of strategic purchasing in Kenya. 
 
Methods: A multiple-case study design composed of two units of study is used. Case one 
comprised implementation of capitation by Kenya’s public purchaser -National Hospital 
Insurance Fund (NHIF). Case two comprised implementation of a few strategic purchasing 
mechanisms by two private purchasers. Data was collected from 8 in-depth interviews (staff 
from private providers, public and private purchasers and an industry expert) and relevant 
documents (provider-purchaser contracts, newspaper articles and grey literature). A modified 
conceptual framework outlining how purchasers use strategic purchasing to shift risks of 
providing care to providers, considering providers’ and purchasers’ powers was used to frame 
analysis. Cross case analysis was used to compare findings. 
 
Results: The NHIF used its regulatory authority in the design of the capitation model and its 
monopsony power to incentivise some private providers to adopt capitation. Some small 
providers accepted and adopted the scheme due to prospects of economic gains. Some large 
private providers perceived the capitation rates as too low and used their monopoly power 
that conferred them bargaining capacity to boycott capitation. Dialogue and consensus 
building between the NHIF and private providers was lacking during implementation of 
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capitation. In case two, private purchasers used contracts to implement a variety of strategic 
purchasing mechanisms with mixed outcomes. Information asymmetry was a source of power 
for providers despite purchasers’ effort to counter it. 
 
Conclusions: Power plays both an enabling and disabling role in implementation of strategic 
purchasing – whilst purchasers have significant power, providers too have powers that can 
counter good intentions. Policy makers should expect private providers may resist 
implementation of mechanisms that shift too much financial risk to providers. Dialogue and 
stakeholder engagement may support implementation of strategic purchasing. 
 
 
Keywords 
Strategic Purchasing, Implementation, Power, Kenya 
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Background 
The United Nations General Assembly in 2015 [1] adopted a resolution on Universal Health 
Coverage (UHC) highlighting the growing recognition of UHC as a global goal worth pursuing. 
Under Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3, target 3.8 encourages countries to strive for 
achievement of UHC, defined as ensuring that all citizens are able to access relevant health 
care whenever they are in need, and in a manner that ensures they are not exposed to 
financial hardship[1, 2]. The World Health Report 2010 [3] states that health financing systems 
need to be designed to specifically ensure that they are aligned to attainment of UHC. A health 
financing system is defined as that part of a health system that is concerned with the 
mobilization, accumulation and allocation of financial resources to provide health coverage 
for a population according to the population’s needs and whose main purpose is to make 
funding available and set the right financial incentives to providers to be efficient[2]. The 
intermediate objectives of a health financing system include ensuring service use is relative 
to need; promoting efficiency in resource utilization; promoting quality; and ensuring 
transparency and accountability in resource utilization – achieving these objectives can 
contribute to achieving UHC over time [3]. Within a health financing system, the purchasing 
function can contribute to achieving these intermediate objectives [2, 3] with evidence from 
various contexts in Africa[4], Asia[5] and developed nations[6] documented. 
Purchasing is the process whereby pooled funds from various sources such as general tax and 
contributory mechanisms are transferred to healthcare providers to obtain services on behalf 
of a given group of beneficiaries or population [7]. Purchasing can either be passive or active 
(strategic). Passive depicts purchasers simply pay bills when presented by providers whilst 
strategic purchasing involves processes that requires continuous searches for the best 
mechanisms to maximize value for funds by deciding which interventions should be 
purchased, how, and from whom [2, 8]. A key decision in strategic purchasing is how to pay 
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providers; this involves the use of various provider payment mechanisms and contractual 
arrangements by purchasers as sources of power to influence provider behaviour and shift 
the risk of providing care to providers to promote efficiency in resource use [9, 10]. Strategic 
purchasing is however not only limited to provider payment mechanisms, it also includes 
other mechanisms such as: monitoring quality of care provided; use of gate keeping 
mechanisms for select services such as referral services; and selective contracting of providers 
[11-13]. Although providers may resist implementation of strategic purchasing mechanisms, 
purchasers can nonetheless use their sources of power over the providers to influence 
provider actions in order to align provider actions with intended health policy outcomes [8, 
10]. Power in this study is defined as a relationship between two people (or parties) whereby 
person A is said to have power over person B to the extent that A can get B to do something 
that B would not have otherwise done [14]. Various sources of power for providers and 
purchasers are identified in literature [7, 15-18] and are applied in the conceptual framework 
as outlined in the next section. 
Purchasing in Kenya 
 
Kenya has made bold declarations on its intention of achieving UHC [19]. Strategic purchasing 
has been named as one of the key policy levers that will be used to support Kenya’s progress 
to achieving UHC [19]. There are two main groups of purchasers in Kenya that pool funds and 
procure services from public and private providers. These purchasers include (1) the public 
social purchaser known as the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) and (2) multiple 
private purchasers [20]. Some of the strategic purchasing mechanisms used by the NHIF 
include roll out of innovative provider payment mechanisms such as capitation, adoption of 
quality assurance mechanisms across its provider network, and selective contracting of 
providers [21, 22]. The NHIF purchases services for roughly 20% of the Kenyan population and 
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procures health services from both public and private providers [23]. The NHIF has an 
estimated 1,600 public and private providers within its network of providers whereby the 
latter are estimated to comprise two thirds of total providers contracted by the NHIF [24]. The 
NHIF has a standardized accreditation and contracting process for all private facilities in Kenya 
[25]. Since its inception in 1966 the NHIF purchased services from public and private providers 
using fee-for-service provider (FFS) payment mechanisms and in 2010 introduced capitation 
for provision of outpatient care for civil servants and further in 2015 used capitation as a 
strategic purchasing mechanism to roll out an outpatient medical scheme for all its other 
beneficiaries in Kenya as part of wider NHIF reforms [23, 25-28]. 
Strategic purchasing mechanisms implemented by private purchasers in Kenya include hiring 
staff with medical knowledge, use of preauthorization processes, selective contracting of 
providers, use of step-down measures and intervening in medical decision-making processes 
[23, 29]. Private purchasers purchase services for roughly 2% of the population [23, 25]. 
Private purchasers in Kenya also purchase services from the same private providers but each 
private purchaser has its own accreditation and contracting process for private providers with 
the main provider payment mechanism being FFS [23, 30]. 
The NHIF covers approximately only 20% whilst private insurers cover only 2% of the 
population. Thus, most Kenyans have no formal health insurance cover and depend on either 
out-of-pocket expenditure for health or accessing services from the public sector under tax 
funded mechanisms[23-25]. 
The role of private providers in healthcare provision in Kenya is important as there are about 
5,234 public and 5,646 private (non-state) providers in Kenya [31]. 
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It’s recognized that purchasers in Kenya will need to make several strategic decisions to 
support achievement of UHC including improving efficiency, cost containment, quality 
improvement and access [19]. Although past reforms focussed on health financing and 
purchasing in Kenya have noble intentions, there are still several gaps and weaknesses in key 
policy areas that policy makers and purchasers need to focus on such as: ensuring equity, 
ensuring benefit package design processes are guided by evidence-based decisions, 
promoting efficiency, and management of stakeholder dynamics [22, 32-36]. Existing 
literature notes that both private and public purchasers in Kenya are yet to fully implement 
effective purchasing mechanisms [23, 37]. As mentioned above, both the NHIF and private 
purchasers have implemented some strategic purchasing mechanism in the last few years. 
While there have been recent efforts to document these implementation experiences [27, 37-
40], overall knowledge on the role of power in influencing the outcomes of implementation 
of strategic purchasing is still relatively limited [23]. This study using a multiple case study 
design with two cases aims to contribute to knowledge on the role of power in the 
implementation of strategic purchasing in Kenya. 
This paper specifically explores sources of power for purchasers (the NHIF and private 
purchasers) and sources of power for private providers and the resultant influence on two 
implementation outcomes, namely the acceptability and adoption of the select strategic 
purchasing mechanisms by private providers in Kenya. Acceptability can be defined as the 
perceptions among private providers of the strategic purchasing mechanisms and the extent 
to which these mechanisms were agreeable to them [41]. Adoption is defined as the 
intentions, initial decisions, and actions of private providers towards implementation of the 
strategic purchasing mechanisms [41]. 
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Conceptual framing for the research 
 
The starting point for this study is a framework (Figure 1 below) introduced by the WHO World 
Health Report 1999 showing how different types of provider payment mechanisms that when 
implemented by purchasers shift the risk of providing care across various parties including 
purchasers and providers [42]. Specific to implementation of strategic purchasing, this 
framework illustrates purchasers shifting from retrospective to prospective provider payment 
methods. 
 
Figure 1 Impact of different financing schemes and provider payment methods on bearing the financial risks of providing 
care 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above framework is then modified to include the key concept of power as shown in figure 2. 
Sources of power for purchasers include: (1) institutional regulatory authority5; (2) the use of 
prospective provider payment mechanisms such as capitation which can be used to transfer more 
risk to providers compared to retrospective mechanisms such as FFS [2, 3]; and (3) having market 
                                                            
5 Having institutional regulatory authority and hence high bargaining authority means that a purchaser has: authority to 
negotiate with providers about the expected quantity, quality, and availability of the interventions to be purchased and 
provided; ability to set and enforce the rules of the game; and responsibility of providing strategic direction for all the 
different actors involved 
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monopsony6 and higher bargaining authority2 over providers that enables them to control providers 
behaviours including adoption of strategic purchasing mechanisms [15, 16, 18]. Sources of power 
for providers include: (1) market monopoly7 and hence higher bargaining3 capacity over purchasers; 
(2) retrospective provider payment methods such as FFS which offers them opportunities to bill 
more for services offered; and the presence of information asymmetry8 which enables providers to 
have the upper hand in deciding which interventions to use when offering care [7, 15-17, 43, 44]. 
We hypothesize that purchasers will use their various sources of power to promote/influence 
provider acceptability and adoption of strategic mechanisms that shift risk from purchasers to 
providers, whilst providers will also use their sources of power to resist the adoption of mechanisms 
that shift the risk of providing care to them [15-18]. 
 
 This hypothesis is applied to the study which aims answer the following research question.  How are 
select strategic purchasing mechanisms implemented in Kenya and what role do the various sources 
of power for purchasers and private providers have in influencing acceptance and adoption of 
strategic purchasing mechanisms by providers?
                                                            
6 Purchasers can be said to have market monopsony power in a market when they are the only buyer in a market with multiple competing providers and are 
able to use their financial power to ensure that service delivery occurs in line with the objectives of efficiency and high quality 
7 Providers are said to have market monopoly and hence higher bargaining capacity when there are few health providers controlling a significant market 
share that enables them to dictate prices and influence decision making in relation to cost, quality of care and type and quantity of interventions to be 
provided in relation to purchasers. 
8 Providers are said to use information asymmetry as a source of power when they take advantage of having more or better information than purchasers. 
This enables purchasers to have power to influence consumer demand for healthcare and to circumvent regulations set by purchasers to control costs and 
provider behaviours. 
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Figure 2 Conceptual framework showing how providers and purchasers may use sources of power to influence the 
implementation of various strategic purchasing mechanisms 
 
 
 
Methodology 
A case study design will enable in-depth examination of the implementation of strategic purchasing 
mechanisms by allowing the researcher to investigate this phenomenon in depth and within its real-
life context [45, 46]. This study design also permits the researcher to answer ‘how’ questions through 
explanatory study components and to generate findings from real- life context [45]. The two cases 
in the study are as follows: 
• Case 1: Implementation of capitation by the NHIF in 2015, 
 
• Case 2: the implementation of select mechanisms private purchasers in Kenya 
including hiring staff with medical knowledge, use of preauthorization processes, 
selective contracting of providers and intervening in medical decision-making 
processes. 
Data collection 
 
Purchasing organizations for this study were purposively selected. The NHIF was chosen as it 
is the sole public purchaser in Kenya. Private purchasers were selected purposively (see 
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selection criteria in Table 1 below). Purposive sampling in implementation research allows 
researchers to narrow down to cases that can yield rich information and insights of interest 
to a researcher [47]. This selection criteria allowed the researcher to focus on institutions 
that were likely to yield the most insights for the study such as: those known to be actively 
involved in intervening in provision of medical care and organizations large enough to have 
the resources needed to invest in strategic purchasing mechanisms. Using the selection 
criteria, four private purchasing organizations emerged (see Table 2) whereby all were 
approached and two of the most willing were selected for the study. 
Table 1 Selection criteria for private purchasers in Kenya 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2 Overview of the main eligible private purchaser institutions for study [28, 30] 
 
Private purchasing 
organization 
Comments in relation to our selection criteria 
Jubilee Highest market share by gross annual medical premiums (2014) 
Has Inpatient and outpatient plans for groups and individuals 
AAR Second largest medical insurer by market share (2014) 
Inpatient and outpatient plan for groups and individuals, previously operated as a HMO 
CIC Third largest medical insurer by market share (2014) 
Has Inpatient and outpatient plan for groups and individuals Has the largest pool for low 
cost products -30,000 lives 
UAP Fourth largest medical insurer by market share (2014) 
Has Inpatient and outpatient plan for groups and individuals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. a registered private insurance firm or a firm registered as a private medical insurance company 
offering inpatient medical insurance as one of its products; 
2. a health insurer who can be deemed to be a major player in the sector by being amongst the top 
four health insurers by market share by gross total premiums as shown in Appendix 1 [48]. 
3. a health insurer that carries considerable financial risk as an underwriter in offering health insuranc 
plans as it is this risk that compels purchasers to employ strategic purchasing mechanisms to 
transfer some of the financial risks of meeting patient’s medical needs to providers[7]. 
4. Institutions having both payer and provider arms (also known as HMOs), third party administrators, 
CBHIS and employer self-funded schemes are thus excluded to narrow focus on purchasers who 
bear significant financial risk. 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria for private purchasers in Kenya 
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Participants for interviews from the three organizations (the NHIF and the two private 
purchasers) were selected purposively. Purposive sampling in qualitative research allows 
selection of respondents in a manner that enables gathering of views from a wide range of 
perspectives [49]. Hence, staff working from strategic to operational levels were targeted. The 
recruitment process involved reaching out to the head of the organization via email or call, 
followed by a face to face meeting whereby they would select suitable staff from their 
organization to participate in the study. The synopsis, questionnaires and the full protocol 
with consent forms was shared in advance prior to data collection with the chosen 
respondents. Selection criteria for participants who were interviewed from both cases is as 
shown in table 3 below. 
Table 3 Selection criteria for interviewees 
 
 
1) Must have experience in either formulating, rolling out or implementing the strategic 
purchasing mechanism of interest 
2) Must have worked in the health insurance industry for a minimum of 3 years for 
operational/junior staff and 5 years for management/senior staff for both public and private 
insurers so as to provide the required insight from personal and institutional knowledge 
acquired over these years 
3) 3) Industry experts must have over 7 years’ experience working in the health insurance sector 
in Kenya so as to also speak of their experiences before and after implementation of strategic 
purchasing mechanisms. 
Note: The criterion was designed to enable selection of respondents who would provide 
significant insight and knowledge from their work experience in strategic purchasing. 
 
Selection criteria for selection of interviewees 
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Four participants (two each from two private purchasers) were interviewed for Case 2. Table 
4 below summarizes sources of interview and documentation (discussed further below) data 
for both cases. 
Table 4 Outline of all the sources of data used in the study 
 
 
A. Case study one (the NHIF-public 
purchaser) 
B.   Case Study two (Private 
purchasers) 
1) One interview with a Senior manager at the 
NHIF 
2) Two interviews with provider managers 
3) One interview with an industry expert 
4) Nine online newspaper articles and 
publications [50-58]. 
5) Standard contract between the NHIF and 
private providers [26] 
6) Data from the NHIF website [59] 
1) Four interviews with private purchaser staff 
2) One interview with an industry expert 
3) Two interviews with provider managers 
4) Eight contracts used by various private 
purchasers to contract private providers [60- 
67] 
5) Association of Kenyan Insurers (AKI) annual 
industry reports 2014[48] 
 
 
Many challenges were faced during recruitment of interviewees for case one due to ongoing 
court cases related to the roll out of capitation by NHIF. Over a period of 15 months, 10 senior 
managers, 12 middle level managers and 18 senior staff and officers in the NHIF were 
approached directly and indirectly but only one senior manager agreed to the interview. 
Additional interviews were then sought comprising of three interviews with: one independent 
industry expert, and two provider manager running hospitals that had worked with the NHIF. 
Interviews were conducted between 2014 and 2017. The interviews were conducted between 
2015 and 2016 by the principal researcher in English at the respondents’ work places and 
lasted about an hour. In-depth interview format involving open ended questions was used. 
In-depth interviewing is a qualitative research technique comprising of intensive individual 
interviews [68] whereby an open-ended, discovery-oriented method is used allowing 
interviewers to deeply explore the feelings and perspectives of respondents on a subject [69]. 
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In-depth interviewing is also most appropriate for situations whereby one wants to derive 
detailed information from a relatively small number of participants [68]. 
Additional documentation data was also collected (between 2015 and 2017) from: online 
sources, newspaper articles, standard contracts between the NHIF and private providers, and 
data from the NHIF website. Although concerns about possibilities of selection bias when 
researchers rely on newspaper data do exist, there are schools of thought that argue that 
newspaper data is not always critically flawed especially if rigorous ways are applied to correct 
the distortions that may arise from selection bias such as triangulation with other sources of 
data [70, 71]. Documentation in case study as a source of evidence is important in 
corroborating and augmenting interview data by serving as a form of triangulation [45, 46]. 
The rationale for selection of the various sources of data used to enrich interview data is 
outlined in Table 5 below. 
Table 5 Overview of rationale for selection of various sources of documentation data 
 
Documentation 
sources of data 
Rationale for inclusion as a source of data 
The NHIF website The website included important information related to the national outpatient 
scheme such as details of the benefit package and communication to providers 
and 
the general public 
Newspaper 
articles 
The articles portrayed and captured various communications that happened 
between the NHIF and private providers on the role out of capitation from 2015 
to 2017 
These are in the form of reported articles by journalists and press statements 
made by the NHIF, private providers and other relevant stakeholders 
Contracts Sample contracts used by purchasers to contract private providers included details 
on contractual arrangements and obligations between the purchasers and private 
providers. 
 
 
 Data management and analysis 
Interview data was transcribed, and the transcripts stored confidentially in password 
protected computers. Each case was analysed separately. For each case, data analysis was 
done using thematic content analysis which involved the following processes: familiarization 
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with the data; identification of codes and themes that had already been derived from the 
conceptual framework (a deductive matrix was constructed based on concepts in the 
conceptual framework and other literature) [72]; coding of the data; and organizing the codes 
and themes [70]. The last step involved organising data horizontally by codes, putting similar 
data together to build categories and finally looking at further relationship from the codes 
[70]. Document analysis was also used to supplement data from the interviews through a 
systematic process of reviewing printed and electronic documents to interpret meaning and 
develop empirical knowledge and as a means of triangulation [46]. The process included using 
the same themes used in analysis of the interview scripts and involved careful reading and re- 
reading of the data to identify patterns in the data [46]. Two distinct case reports were then 
generated. 
Cross case analysis techniques used involved detailed descriptions of each of the two cases 
followed by comparative analysis across the two cases [73, 74]. Cross case analysis can be 
defined as a methodology that allows researchers to compare similarities and differences in 
events, activities and processes amongst separate case studies [75]. This involved comparing 
the pertinent themes and then merging the finds across the two cases [74, 75]. 
Results 
 
This section includes description of the initial roll out of capitation by the NHIF and that of 
select purchasing mechanisms by private purchasers. Findings on the influence of different 
sources of power on the two implementation outcomes of interest (acceptability and 
adoption by providers) are discussed from the perspective of providers and purchasers. 
The initial roll out of capitation by the NHIF 
The NHIF gazetted and rolled out provision of outpatient care to all NHIF beneficiaries across 
the country in 2015 using capitation as a strategic purchasing mechanism [25]. Contracts from 
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2015 with the private contracted providers revealed that the capitation amount was capped 
at KES 1,200 (approx. USD 12) per annum per person paid out in four equal quarterly 
instalments [26]. Providers were expected to be chosen by a minimum of 30 enrolees and the 
benefit package included basic outpatient care similar to the Kenya Essential Package of 
Health (KEPH) [26, 58, 76]. The NHIF beneficiaries across the country were expected to enrol 
with any provider of their choice from a list of providers who had agreed to the terms of the 
NHIF outpatient capitation scheme [56]. There was nation wide publicity through various 
forms of media including newspapers on the various aspects of the rollout including: 
announcements of the accredited providers in a list provided on the NHIF website[59]; 
declaration by NHIF of the rates that providers would be paid[56]; and announcements of 
services covered by the scheme[26, 56, 58, 59]. Provider acceptability of capitation was mixed 
[54], as discussed later, but despite this, the NHIF was keen on ensuring that the model was 
adopted without any changes to its design and more so the capitation rate- the rates would 
later lead to controversy between the NHIF and some providers [53, 54, 56, 58]. 
There is evidence of some stakeholder engagement and discussions between the NHIF and 
some private providers prior and during implementation of the capitation model. 
Interviewees reported that the NHIF initiated dialogue by holding meetings with private 
provider representatives to introduce the capitation model. Meetings were in the form of half 
day workshops/seminars whereby the NHIF would make presentations and invite 
stakeholders to give feedback. During these forums the NHIF outlined how capitation would 
work and presented its advantages to providers. The NHIF also hoped to allay any fears that 
providers had as capitation was still new in Kenya as noted by the NHIF respondent. 
“There were a series of very many meetings because at first it was a new concept, so they 
could not understand this issue of capitation and what capitation is all about. Because to 
them what they are used to is fee-for-service but now when you introduce a new system 
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of capitation, most of them were a bit hesitant- because they were asking ‘Where has it 
worked? Where has this capitation, how sure are we, we are going to break even since we 
are going to make losses’ So there were a series of very many meetings and engagements 
between NHIF and the service providers” (D001 page 2: Senior NHIF manager) 
 
 
The NHIF tried to convince providers of the merits of capitation by explaining it would be 
better than FFS as it would lower administration costs for providers, and that providers who 
enrolled large numbers of beneficiaries would receive more money. 
“I think the approach also helped because being, being a new concept and trying to explain 
to them [providers] the way we are going to reduce the claim process- the paper work. You 
know the fee-for-service involved a lot [of claim processes] but now since we are 
transferring the funds to them, they didn’t have to now to claim the money from us and 
also the issue of the margins. If you have the numbers, chances are you going to make 
more money from capitation than from fee-for-service?” (D001 page 2: Senior NHIF 
manager). 
 
 
The initial roll out of strategic purchasing mechanisms by private purchasers 
 
Private purchasers implemented strategic purchasing mechanisms as part of normal business 
processes over the last five to ten years for cost control and quality assurance. Private 
purchasers hired staff including medical doctors and case managers to overcome information 
asymmetry – essentially to ensure that the purchaser had the best information available to 
make decisions about payment [23, 30]. Case managers (majority having nursing 
backgrounds) were the main link between providers and purchasers and oversaw 
preauthorization processes, initiated step-down processes and were responsible for seeking 
second opinions from specialist doctors whenever need arose. Case managers made hospital 
visits aimed at improving relations with the providers and as audit and quality assurance 
mechanisms. 
Providers were frequently required to seek written approvals (preauthorizations) from 
purchasers when offering some services such as: inpatient admission, dental and optical 
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services. Case managers assessed and confirmed the need for the proposed interventions. 
The enforcement of the preauthorization processes was through detailed inclusion in the 
provider-purchaser contracts [60-67]. Purchasers used contracts to selectively accredit 
providers. The contracts were institution specific although there was significant uniformity 
across different purchasers [60-67]. 
In cases where the benefit package of a patient had been exhausted or would not be enough 
to cover continued admission in a given facility, the purchaser would recommend that the 
patient be transferred to a cheaper facility or risk having the patient or provider cover the 
cost of care. This intervention was referred to as step-down. 
Implementation outcomes (acceptability and adoption) of strategic purchasing mechanisms 
The study found mixed reactions by private providers to various mechanisms. Provider 
adoption and acceptance was largely driven by provider perception of potential financial gains 
or risks associated with a given mechanism. Providers viewed mechanisms perceived to be of 
economic value positively and negatively viewed those perceived to have potential economic 
risks. 
Acceptability of the NHIF’s capitation model 
      A provider manager noted that most of the large private hospitals perceived the proposed 
capitation rate of approximately USD 12 as too low and unsustainable. Similar sentiments 
were echoed by representatives of the provider association known as the Kenya Association 
of Private Hospitals (KAPH) who proposed a much higher capitation rate as noted by local 
press [58]. 
 
“Private hospitals led by Dr John Nyauma, the chairman of the Kenya Association of Private 
Hospitals (KAPH), a national association of medium and small private hospitals in Kenya, 
have in the past claimed that an independent study said to have been commissioned by 
the government and conducted by fund managers, Alexander Forbes, corroborated their 
claims that the current caps are not sufficient for effective healthcare for contributors. 
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They have insisted they would only consider implementing the plan if NHIF reviews the 
figure to at least Sh 6,000 with the ideal being Sh20,000 in line with the said study” [58]. 
A senior NHIF manager noted that provider dissatisfaction with the rates was a huge challenge 
to implementation. 
“Uuumh the main challenge that we are facing, the amount we are capitating is still, is 
still not adequate as per the facilities” (D001, page 5: Senior NHIF Manager) 
Private providers opposed to these rates used the press to express their disagreement and 
claimed that the NHIF had not conducted sufficient research when coming up with the rates 
[57, 58]. This was also reiterated by a provider manager. 
“They have to do some market research actually and find out from the pharmaceutical 
companies what the selling rate of the drugs are. From the laboratory companies, what 
are their—then now you come up with some rates that are more or less in touch with how 
the market dynamics are. Because we purchase the drugs, we purchase the reagents, we 
have to pay the doctor, you know the doctor is not for free. So you have to factor all those 
things in as you’re pricing. Yeah”. (NWM001, page 5: Private Provider Manager). 
Although the NHIF respondent noted that the NHIF had conducted some successful pilots that 
guided the determination of these rates, we could not source any publicly available 
documentation of these pilot study results. 
Providers also felt that during meetings with the NHIF, there was very little room for 
negotiation and that the NHIF was forcing the rates on them. 
“And the only problem with NHIF is they don’t listen to what people are saying…” (LHA001, 
page 2: Private Provider Manager). 
Senior NHIF staff were however quoted by leading newspapers confirming that some 
providers were more open to trying the new rates [58]. These articles and interview data 
suggest that these providers felt that there was an opportunity to make a profit from the 
scheme by garnering large numbers of people allocated to them [53, 54, 58]. An industry 
expert also confirmed that some of the smaller facilities were open to this scheme despite 
the resistance by some of the larger providers. 
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“I think for the providers them, they…. remember the Mater hospital, the Aghakhan, the 
Nairobi Hospital the AARs did not participate, it’s the Meridian, the small groups who 
agreed to do it at a very low price point…” (IEM001, page 2: Health Industry Expert) 
 
Adoption of the NHIF’s capitation model for provision of outpatient care 
 
Provider adoption of the NHIF outpatient capitation scheme was varied. Some large providers 
such as Nairobi Hospital, Gertrude Children Hospital Aghakhan University Hospitals, Mater 
Hospital, and MP Shah Hospital amongst others resisted the scheme and staged a boycott to it 
as reported in various newspapers [51-54]. 
“Top private hospitals are missing from the list of providers that the National Hospital 
Insurance Fund (NHIF) published on Monday for its outpatient services, a pointer that 
they have failed to strike a deal with the public health purchaser” [52] 
 
 
Top local newspapers showcased the conflict between the NHIF and KAPH whereby the NHIF 
insisted that the rates and the model were sustainable whilst the latter challenged this 
position [50-58]. Some providers whom the NHIF had listed as amongst those who chose to 
provide outpatient services under the NHIF capitation model scheme were also noted to have 
turned away patients seeking care from them under this scheme [53-55, 57]. It is unclear how 
providers who claimed not to have been part of the scheme had been listed as part of it. These 
newspaper articles from 2015 and 2016 reflect this. 
“Mr John Nyaumah, the chairman of the Kenya Association of Private Hospitals, said 
the NHIF's list of 1,500 private and public hospitals was not current and no negotiations 
were concluded with the private hospitals”[50] 
 
“Private hospitals have been at loggerheads with the NHIF since July in what has seen 
them turn away patients seeking outpatient treatment under the State cover saying 
the Sh1,200 capitation per year is inadequate”[57]. 
 
Over time some providers who had initially rejected the scheme later adopted it. One of the 
provider managers interviewed confirmed that they had been hesitant to enrol but later 
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changed their mind and adopted the scheme when they realized they could capitalize on the 
huge volumes of clients the NHIF had. Interviews with the NHIF manager and industry expert 
further revealed that some of these providers hoped to make money from these patients from 
other services over and above the outpatient capitation scheme such as inpatient care. 
Some of the providers who had adopted the capitation scheme earlier, later opted out of the 
outpatient capitation scheme but continued to work with the NHIF under other provider 
payment services such as provision of inpatient care under FFS. Termination of the NHIF 
capitation contract by providers was typically done in writing at the end of a given quarter 
[26]. 
The scheme thus emerged to have largely been accepted by some of the small and mid-sized 
providers and opposed by most of the large private providers. A section of providers who 
adopted the scheme have continued pushing for an increase in the rates as they felt that they 
were still quite low as noted by the NHIF manager. However, NHIF has not yielded to these 
efforts and rates had not been changed by 2018[37]. 
 
 Acceptability and adoption of strategic purchasing mechanisms implemented by private 
purchasers 
  
Private purchasers were also faced with mixed reactions from private providers during 
implementation. Mechanisms that were deemed beneficial by providers such as 
preauthorization processes and step-down were relatively well accepted and adopted and 
can be linked to financial considerations by providers. For example, some providers felt that 
the preauthorization process gave them an assurance that the purchaser would honour their 
bills. Similarly, some of the providers with relatively higher fees were co-operative with the 
step-down mechanism as they felt it minimized their risks of unpaid bills as the patients would 
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be transferred from them before they had exhausted their benefits as noted by a case 
manager. 
“[step-down] is advantageous to the providers because it will save them the rejected 
costs at the end of the day or exceed benefits” (UAPJ002, page 9: Private purchaser 
case manager). 
The use of second opinions was unfavourable as some providers felt that the insurer was 
intruding into their space as this was used by purchasers to confirm the necessity of high cost 
interventions proposed by providers. Providers contested this citing that it was likely to 
reduce their professional autonomy. 
Providers disagreed to implementation of second opinions as they felt it (that these 
second opinions typically from third parties working on behalf of purchasers) may 
infringe on their professional work especially if the insurer was disagreeing with the 
treatment the provider was offering. (UAPJ001, page 3: Private Purchaser Case 
Manager) 
 
In some instances, an intervention would have different perceptions amongst different 
providers. For example, one case manager felt that large providers in urban places found 
hospital visits more acceptable compared to smaller rural providers. 
“Other places that are remote, because there are some places that we are not able to 
reach on a daily basis and maybe they are not used to insurers or the care managers 
frequenting, once we visit as an impromptu, it’s a surprise, it leaves them maybe 
worried, ‘is there something that they have come to find out, is there something that 
they maybe they are suspecting? ..But for, I can say in Nairobi, these other major 
towns, Mombasa, Eldoret, Kisumu, Nakuru, we are expected, actually when you don’t 
go , they even notice”. (CICM001, page 5: Private Purchaser Case Manager). 
 
 
Use of preauthorization processes seemed to be the most widely adopted intervention. Case 
managers interviewed felt that most of the providers they worked with seemed to have 
complied with the preauthorization processes as spelt out in the purchaser-provider 
contracts. 
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“Most of the providers are cooperative and collaborate with the insurance staff as 
successful preauthorizations also provide them the assurance that their claims will be 
paid by the insurer” (UAPJ001, page 4: Private purchaser case manager) 
 
However, there were still instances where some providers did not fully cooperate with the 
process and sought preauthorization from the purchaser based on incomplete or incorrect 
information. 
“Because we have had [situations during preauthorization process] where doctors or 
hospitals tell you this is what it is, they tell you this is what is in the file but when they 
write a medical report, they bring something that is very different from what you saw 
or from what you talked [the final providers’ medical report contradicting the initial 
medical report]” (CICM001, Private purchaser Case Manager). 
 
Overview of the role of power in implementation 
Potential sources of power for purchasers include: institutional regulatory authority; 
prospective provider payment mechanisms; and monopsony and bargaining authority whilst 
for providers include: monopoly and bargaining capacity; retrospective provider payment 
mechanisms, and information asymmetry [2, 3, 7, 15, 42]. 
Sources of power for the NHIF 
 
As the public institution mandated to design and implement social health insurance coverage 
for all Kenyans, the NHIF was able to use its regulatory authority to design and implement the 
capitation model and dictate the terms and conditions to providers by issuing a gazette notice 
[77]. Consequently, the NHIF presented non-negotiable rates to the private providers and 
despite significant resistance from some providers [51-58], the NHIF felt that it had regulatory 
and monopsony power over providers. 
“I think the way it stands at now we still have the upper hand since aaaah most of 
them have tried to offer (resistance)..(D001, page 4: Senior NHIF Manager) 
 
This was also confirmed by a different provider manager who informed that although the NHIF 
could not force private providers to adopt the capitation scheme, the NHIF used its 
monopsony to influence adoption. 
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They [the NHIF] can’t force [providers] but they have the negotiating power because 
of the large number of people that they cover. So, as I told you, smaller facilities that 
depend mainly on NHIF are unable to sustain their business without NHIF coming on 
board. So, that is-- basically they have the carrot that they dangle for smaller facilities 
(LHA001, page 3: Private Provider Manager). 
 
 
The NHIF’s large pool of beneficiaries created a monopsony that enabled the NHIF to entice 
small and mid-sized providers to accept the rates as some of these providers found the 
volumes of potential business offered by the NHIF too attractive to ignore as confirmed by an 
industry expert. 
“So, at the end of the day NHIF knows that they have the bigger purse, so they divide 
and rule. So, they get one, two, three facilities that accept, and what usually happens 
is, if the very few facilities accept, they have a higher number in terms of people 
allocated. (IEM003, page 2: Health Industry expert). 
 
The NHIF also used capitation as a source of power as this prospective provider payment mechanism 
ensured the NHIF would determine the costs of care in advance. Capitation was hence used to shift 
the financial risk of providing care to the providers by the NHIF as the providers would only be paid by 
NHIF as per the total number of people enrolled and not by the quantity of services provided [7, 23, 
26]. 
Sources of power for private purchasers 
 
Contracts gave private purchasers the ability to control provider behaviours through inclusion 
of clauses supporting various mechanisms such as pre-authorization and hospital visits. [60- 
67]. Hiring case managers and medical specialists increased the bargaining capacity (a source 
of power) of private purchasers and reduced information asymmetry. Case managers were 
able to use their medical knowledge to validate provider interventions in relation to cost 
efficiency, quality of care and appropriateness. A case manager reflected on her role in 
overcoming information asymmetry when assessing length of stay after surgical operations. 
“We [case managers] are guided a lot by our own experiences. You don’t expect 
somebody going in with tonsils to stay seven days unless there is an underlying 
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problem, there is something else that’s making them stay”. (UAP1, page 4: Private 
Purchaser Case Manager) 
 
Sources of power for private providers 
Some of the large providers used their financial power (monopoly) to 'walk away' from the 
negotiations and boycott the NHIF capitation model. These providers had significant 
monopoly and bargaining capacity due to their size and market share. 
“For bigger facilities, capitation does not work. They have refused and that is how it 
has remained. So NHIF cannot do anything, so they have to look for other facilities that 
are willing”. (LHA001, page 3: Provider Manager) 
 
These large providers also came together through their association to counter NHIF as 
mentioned earlier. This coming together likely increased the network power (which is “derived from 
collective knowledge, action and homophily”) of the large providers [78],  which would have increased the 
providers’ bargaining capacity over the NHIF. 
The number of established private providers was relatively few and composed of large 
providers who had hence had enough monopoly to dictate prices of their services in relation 
to private and public purchasers. 
“We don’t have many [providers]… in fact you can calculate the number of quality 
health care providers both inpatient and outpatient in Kenya. They are limited, you can 
count them! If you ask anyone ‘where did you [if you are insured] where did you go?’ 
They will tell you they went to ‘this number 1, number 2 (provider)’, there are few top 
health care providers! Which then makes them concentrate a lot of power. They have 
the upper hand in determining prices and relationships with the payers. So we know 
for sure that their relationship is one whereby the providers call the shots in the 
market” (IEM001, page 4: Industry Expert). 
 
Some of the large providers also had a lot of clout and loyalty amongst patients which they 
used to increase their rates as noted by a case manager who reiterated an example of 
patients’ feelings. 
“My [referring to patient] mind is set. I can only be healed at (XYZ) hospital!’’ (UAPJ001, 
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page 14: Private Insurer). 
 
 
Information asymmetry is a commonly known source of power for providers. Case managers 
were specifically introduced by purchasers to reduce information asymmetry. While the case 
manager mechanism was adopted by providers, information asymmetry still existed to some 
degree.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
As per the conceptual framework a move from passive to strategic purchasing (from left to 
right) indicates that the risk of providing care is increasingly borne by providers. Using the 
modified conceptual framework (we added the concept of power), we had hypothesized that 
purchasers may use their various sources of power to promote/influence provider 
acceptability and adoption of strategic mechanisms that increasingly shift risk from 
purchasers to providers, whilst providers may also use their own sources of power to resist 
the adoption of mechanisms that shift the risk of providing care to them. This discussion 
section will reflect on this hypothesis using the findings presented above. The study found 
that purchasers in Kenya did use sources of power (regulatory authority, monopsony and 
provider payment mechanisms) to influence the acceptability and adoption of strategic 
purchasing mechanisms, however their power has limits as providers found some 
mechanisms unacceptable and resisted adoption, using their own source of provider power 
(monopoly and bargaining capacity, information asymmetry and provider payment 
mechanisms) to do so. 
Public purchasers, private providers and power in implementation 
 
Using institutional regulatory authority as a source of power, the NHIF as the public social 
insurer, was able to set the costs of care as part of the design of capitation as a strategic 
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purchasing mechanism. International literature shows that purchasers do use their regulatory 
authority to determine design aspects of various strategic purchasing mechanisms [78]. For 
example, in the Netherlands prices for primary care services are very tightly regulated by the 
purchaser as a cost control measure [78]. 
Capitation, a provider payment mechanism, is itself a source of power for purchasers 
frequently used to achieve cost management, equity and increase coverage [79]. It is thus 
important that it is accepted and adopted (implementation outcomes) by providers in order 
to reap these benefits from strategic purchasing. However, having the regularity authority to 
design capitation models and set prices does not necessarily equal the power to influence the 
acceptability and adoption of capitation on the ground by providers. In Kenya some of the 
large providers found the capitation rate unacceptable and refused to adopt capitation. 
The large private providers mentioned in the study used their monopoly power in the market 
to resist capitation as they are not reliant on the NHIF as a sole revenue source with private 
purchasers forming a significant share of their revenues. International examples also show 
that large providers are more likely to use monopoly to dictate prices to purchasers, as shown 
in the US [44, 80] 
Using monopoly power, some of the large private providers in Kenya, were thus able to resist 
capitation and thus FFS is still highly prevalent in Kenya’s private healthcare market. A recent 
study notes that private providers in Kenya are so powerful that NHIF is in a state of ‘purchaser 
capture’ whereby providers are able to influence FFS payment rates leading to inflated costs 
that threaten the NHIF’s financial sustainability [25]. Recent studies in Kenya shows that NHIF 
is more able to control cost of care for services offered under capitation compared to services 
under FFS [23, 25]. 
Media can also be used for agenda setting, influencing public perceptions as well as 
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influencing policy outcomes [81]. Our study found that the larger providers also used the 
media as an additional source of power to express their resistance to the capitation model 
and showcase how unsustainable it was. The NHIF countered this by also using the media to 
justify the capitation rate by showing that many other providers had accepted it. Policy 
makers should thus be cognizant of the role of mass media and public perception has on 
interventions rolled out by public purchasers. 
While the NHIF did not have much power to influence adoption by the larger private 
providers, the NHIF does have a huge number of beneficiaries listed with them, thus giving 
them access to monopsony power in the market. In this case study we found that the NHIF 
used this power to influence the acceptability and adoption of capitation by smaller providers 
who rely on the NHIF for the bulk of their revenue. Literature notes that large purchasers can 
use their size to take advantage of economies of scale and negotiate with providers from a 
strong position [82]. The smaller private providers in Kenya, who lack monopoly power, were 
more willing to engage with the NHIF and the capitation rate was more acceptable to them 
due to the prospect of future economic gains from the capitation model. Such economic 
prospects are also noted in various studies such as in Ghana where providers viewed 
capitation positively due to fact that they received payments before offering care [83] and in 
Thailand where providers anticipated to enrol more people and hence generate more 
revenues [84]. 
International literature notes that when faced with a surplus of choice of providers to work 
with, purchasers will select those who they are able to negotiate or agree with and may even 
adopt a take-it or leave it approach to the provider[85] as is the case with the NHIF’s 
implementation of capitation. 
Private purchasers, private providers and power in implementation 
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In response to information asymmetry in the Kenyan healthcare market, private purchasers 
introduced various strategic purchasing mechanisms, including hiring staff with medical 
knowledge to intervene in clinical decision-making, use of pre-authorization processes and 
implementation of step-down measures. Their main source of power was found to be their 
bargaining authority, as expressed by the fact that they controlled the design of contracts that 
documented the strategic purchasing mechanisms that would be put in place. They were thus 
freely able to include these strategic purchasing mechanisms in contracts and private 
providers had to adopt these mechanisms as they had signed the contract. Literature notes 
that purchasers frequently use contracts to gain power over providers [7] and that contracts 
are more impactful whereby purchasers can select from competing providers [86]. Despite the 
existence of contracts, the balance of power can still frequently favour large providers over 
purchasers especially where provider monopoly exists [86]. Contracts thus do have limits in 
terms of influencing the acceptability and adoption of reforms. 
Even though all the strategic purchasing mechanisms implemented by private purchasers 
shifted risk to private providers, some were deemed more acceptable than others and 
willingly adopted by providers and providers therefore did not demonstrate explicit exercises 
of power when this happened. For example, pre-authorization gave the providers an 
assurance of payment whilst step-down reduced the risks of unpaid claims. 
Private providers did however resist two other mechanisms. Some evidence in our case 
indicated that private providers resisted full adoption of medical intervention in clinical 
decision-making, they resisted by not disclosing all relevant information when requested by 
the purchaser in relation to clinical decisions – thus providers used information asymmetry as 
a source of power and resistance. In relation to case managers, staff from some rural and 
small private providers often took long periods of time to deal with requests for information 
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especially during hospital visits thus showing resistance to full adoption 
Results from both cases underline the fact that power plays an important role in 
implementation [87]. Data from both cases demonstrates that while the use of regulatory 
authority and contracts may be powerful when designing strategic purchasing mechanisms, 
ultimately the adoption thereof can be countered by providers who also have power in the 
market to resist mechanisms they find unacceptable. 
Literature notes that private and public providers in Kenya generally feel that the NHIF has 
still not held enough dialogue and gotten consensus with them especially on the NHIF 
capitation rates[36, 83]. In Ghana providers felt that they lacked a say on the implementation 
of strategic purchasing mechanisms by the public social health insurer and that further[83], 
there was breakdown in communication between providers and the purchaser[88]. There is 
limited emphasis in consensus building and dialogue amongst the private purchasers and 
private providers in the second case. This could be as a result of the fact that private 
purchasers engage providers on an individual basis when contracting them as opposed to a 
group as seen with the NHIF. This seems to be less ‘messy’ and tedious in comparison to the 
experience of the NHIF and providers. 
It is important to note that during implementation of strategic purchasing within a health 
system, the government’s involvement is imperative to balance the various actors’ different 
interests and to promote proper provision of well-coordinated services in line with the 
population needs [89]. This stewardship role of government involves guiding the entire health 
system along policies as ultimately it is good policy making, governance and management that 
will ensure purchasing decisions are aligned to the population needs [89].  For example, 
recent evidence from the Philippines shows that where government’s role of stewardship is 
not fully exercised this can lead to situations whereby purchasers attempt to fill the void 
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through self-stewardship which is undesirable as the principal agent relationship between 
government and purchaser is then weakened [90].   
Additionally, similar to a study focussed on improving strategic purchasing in Indonesia, 
purchasers and policy makers in Kenya should explore ways to modify pricing negotiation 
mechanisms with both private and public hospitals; strengthen the monitoring and 
performance evaluation of contracted hospitals; and provide favourable policies to support 
performance improvement of both private and public hospitals [90]. 
Dialogue, consensus building and the role of the media as influences in implementation are 
not included in the modified conceptual framework, we find however that these three items 
can potentially play an important role in the development of strategic purchasing 
mechanisms, the communication of information around strategic purchasing mechanisms 
potentially leading to less resistance in the adoption of strategic purchasing mechanisms. 
Public purchasers and policy makers hence need to ensure the following are carried out during 
implementation: careful preparations; extensive stakeholder engagement; but nonetheless 
expect multiple challenges [91]. 
Limitations of the research 
 
A purposive sample that included a wider range of interviewees and stakeholders would have 
yielded greater insights on this study; a longitudinal approach would have also provided more 
nuances. Nonetheless, this study serves as a starting point in thinking about the 
implementation of strategic purchasing mechanisms in Kenya. Only a few interviews were 
conducted despite efforts to include more participants from the NHIF. However, we are of the 
view that after triangulation with data from newspaper articles, contracts and other 
documents, a reasonable amount of validity was achieved. There was also high level of 
consistency between data from the interviews and that from documentation.  
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Conclusion 
 
Countries striving to achieve UHC will need to implement health financing reforms that place 
emphasis on shifting from passive to strategic purchasing mechanisms. Although purchasing 
reforms cannot be done in isolation of other health systems and health financing reforms, the 
purchasing functions still deserves special focus. Findings from the study demonstrate the 
critical need for policy makers to apply stakeholder analysis approaches prior to implementing 
strategic purchasing mechanisms to enhance the political viability of these mechanisms. 
Stakeholder analysis should include an understanding of the various stakeholders such as 
providers and purchasers including their powers and interests in relation to the strategic 
purchasing mechanisms [92] 
Private providers have significant sources of power such as monopoly that they use to resist 
implementation of mechanisms that they perceive erode their economic gains. Private 
purchasers in Kenya will need to explore ways of countering the prevailing sources of power 
of some private providers. 
Although the NHIF also yielded significant power over some private providers during 
implementation of capitation, there may have been less resistance from some providers had 
mechanisms for enabling more extensive dialogue and consensus building with providers 
been put in place. 
We recommend further research that is aimed at shedding more insights on how policy 
makers and purchasers in Kenya can roll out strategic purchasing mechanisms using processes 
that are responsive and adaptive to the influence of sources of power for both providers and 
purchasers. 
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1. APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 Overview of study population (registered health insurance firm in Kenya and their market share by gross 
medical premium in 2014 [48] 
 
 Company Name Gross Medical premiums 
1 Jubilee 5,023,079,580.00 
2 AAR 3,494,335,863.00 
3 CIC General 3,083,556,000.00 
4 UAP General 2,950,268,000.00 
5 Resolution 2,479,608,000.00 
6 APA 2,380,217,000.00 
7 Heritage 1,250,751,000.00 
8 Britam 1,127,961,000.00 
9 First Assurance 899,520,000.00 
10 GA 863,519,000.00 
11 Britam General 608,928,000.00 
12 Madison 465,628,000.00 
13 Gateway 211,293,475.00 
14 ICEA LION 150,975,000.00 
15 Saham 122,392,000.00 
16 Pacis 105,967,000.00 
17 Kenindia 92,201,000.00 
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Appendix 2 Research Questionnaire NHIF 
 
Research Questionnaire - NHIF 
 
1. How long have you worked in health financing and health insurance in the country? 
 
2. How long have you worked at NHIF and what is your current role at NHIF as regards to 
health care financing? 
3. Are you involved in the roll out of the new capitation model? Could you describe your 
involvement so far? 
4. Please describe the capitation model as applied by the NHIF to implement its 
outpatient scheme? 
5. How was the model rolled out amongst the private providers? (Was there any 
consultation, price and rates negotiation, prior agreement on provider selection and 
contracting terms etc.?) 
6. What were the initial reactions from providers to the way the capitation model was 
rolled out? Are there any experiences from initial engagements such as first meetings, 
feedback from providers? 
7. Were there any elements of the roll out they were disagreeable on? Please explain. 
 
8. How did private providers express any such disagreement? 
 
9. Did the NHIF have any power to enforce/promote their terms and protect its interests 
in cases where providers were not fully agreeable? 
10. Please explain in detail sources of such power and how they were used by the NHIF 
 
11. Did private providers have any powers to resist the NHIF capitation terms and 
promote their interests regarding any aspects they were not agreeable with? 
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12. Please explain in detail sources of such power and how they were used by private 
providers to modify or resist aspects of the capitation model that they were not fully 
agreeable with? 
13. Could you describe the main successes of the roll out this far? 
 
14. Could you describe the main challenges of the roll out so far? 
 
15. What do you think will happen in the future? Why do you think this? 
 
16. Is there anything else you think I may have missed that is relevant to our discussion 
 
that you’d like to add? 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME!!! 
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Appendix 3 Research Questionnaire - PRIVATE PURCHASERS 
 
Research Questionnaire - PRIVATE PURCHASERS 
1) How long have you worked in health financing and health insurance in the country? 
 
2) What is your current/main role at this institution as regards to health insurance? 
 
3) Does your institution intervene in clinical decision-making processes in the 
management of inpatient medical schemes? If so, please list the various methods 
used and your involvement. 
4) Please describe each of the interventions above in detail. Explain how and when they 
were rolled out. 
5) What are the objectives of each of the methods and how successful have they 
been in achieving them? 
6) What were the initial reactions from providers to the use of these interventions? Are 
there any experiences from initial engagements such as first meetings, feedback from 
providers? 
7) Were there any elements of these interventions that providers were disagreeable 
on? Please explain. 
8) How did private providers express any such disagreement? 
 
9) Did your firm have any power to enforce/promote these interventions protect your 
interests in cases where providers were not fully agreeable? 
10) Please explain in detail sources of such power and how you used them 
 
11) Did private providers have any power to resist full implementation of the 
interventions or that prevented the interventions achieving their full objectives? 
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12) Please explain in detail sources of such power and how they were used by private 
providers to protect their interests or modify/resist aspects of the interventions 
that they were not fully agreeable with? 
13) Could you describe the main successes of the interventions so far? 
 
14) Could you describe the main challenges of the roll out so far? 
 
15) What do you think will happen in the future? Why do you think this? 
 
16) Is there anything else you think I may have missed that is relevant to our discussion 
 
that you’d like to add? 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME!!! 
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Appendix 4 Justification for inclusion of additional sources of data 
 
Justification for inclusion of press releases and other sources of data 
The objective of this research was to document experiences of both private and public 
purchasers in introduction, roll out and implementation of strategic purchasing mechanisms 
in Kenya amongst private health providers. The mainstay of data collection would be 
conducting face- to-face in-depth interviews with key respondents from public and private 
purchasers. This comprised of about 4 interviewees from two private insurance companies 
and 4 interviews from the NHIF- the main public purchaser in Kenya. Two strategic 
purchasing mechanisms were identified for research as follows: intervening in clinical 
decision-making processes in management of inpatient medical cover by private insurers; 
and introduction and roll out of capitation to provide outpatient medical cover by the NHIF. 
Ethics approval was gotten from the University of Cape Town, S. Africa. 
Data collection amongst the private insurers progressed as planned with minimal delays 
with the four interviews planned and conducted within three months after ethics approval. 
However, there were significant delays with access to respondents working in the NHIF. The 
researcher initially tried getting institutional approval from management of the NHIF 
through contacting the CEO’s office but there was no response. Eventually there was verbal 
communication that different the NHIF staff could participate but with approval from their 
senior managers. The processes of getting approval to conduct interviews then involved 
contacting different senior managers within the organization through telephone calls, 
emails, and conducting face-to-face meetings. As most senior NHIF managers were 
frequently busy with office work or on travel, a typical appointment would take about two 
months before getting consent for a face to face meeting to have a discussion about the 
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study. In total, six senior managers and multiple other officers were contacted by the lead 
researcher with all declining to take part in the interview apart from one senior manager. 
Their main reason was that there was a lot of controversy regarding the capitation issue 
that included even on-going court cases. Effort by the lead researcher to allay any fears of 
identification of respondents as well as their freedom to decline to answer questions they 
were not comfortable with were not successful. Disclosure that recording of the interview 
was also a critical part of data collection also discouraged many potential interviewees. In 
total, about eight months were lost in trying to seek interviews with NHIF respondents 
which resulted in only one senior manager being willing to take part. Efforts to request 
interviews with other NHIF staff did not also bear any fruits. 
 
 
After various consultations it was deemed prudent to look for other additional sources of 
data to complement existing data on the implementation of capitation by the NHIF. This 
was done through a search and review of online materials on the NHIF’s capitation 
initiative. Majority of the materials that emerged was made up of newspaper articles and 
reports. These were as a result of various stakeholders such as the NHIF and private 
providers calling press conferences on the topic as the roll out of capitation by the NHIF was 
an issue that received a lot of media coverage and attention. Efforts were ensured that only 
mainstream news publishers that had developed credibility over the years were included. 
There was also an effort to triangulate information from different news publishers. In 
addition, available press releases and reports from the stakeholders were also reviewed. 
Opinion articles were largely avoided with emphasis laid mainly on articles resulting from 
press releases, press conferences or press interviews by various stakeholders. These online 
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materials and in a particular online news articles were quite helpful in shedding more light 
on the reactions of private providers and the NHIF management during the roll out of 
capitation scheme. They were thus important sources of data more so in the absence of 
multiple NHIF interviews as well as providing an unbiased reporting perspective. 
Another source of data used was contracts between the NHIF and providers. These were 
quite detailed and helped to collaborate some of the facts raised gotten from the interviews 
and newspaper articles. 
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APPENDIX 2: Instructions to Authors 
 
International Journal for Equity in Health instructions to authors 
Preparing your manuscript 
The information below details the section headings that you should include in your 
manuscript and what information should be within each section. 
 
Please note that your manuscript must include a 'Declarations' section including all of the 
subheadings (please see below for more information). 
 
Title page 
The title page should: 
 
• present a title that includes, if appropriate, the study design e.g.: 
o "A versus B in the treatment of C: a randomized controlled trial", "X is a risk 
factor for Y: a case control study", "What is the impact of factor X on subject 
Y: A systematic review" 
o or for non-clinical or non-research studies a description of what the article 
reports 
• list the full names, institutional addresses and email addresses for all authors 
o if a collaboration group should be listed as an author, please list the Group 
name as an author. If you would like the names of the individual members of 
the Group to be searchable through their individual PubMed records, please 
include this information in the “Acknowledgements” section in accordance 
with the instructions below 
• indicate the corresponding author 
Abstract 
The Abstract should not exceed 350 words. Please minimize the use of abbreviations and do 
not cite references in the abstract. Reports of randomized controlled trials should follow 
the CONSORT extension for abstracts. The abstract must include the following separate 
sections: 
 
• Background: the context and purpose of the study 
• Methods: how the study was performed and statistical tests used 
• Results: the main findings 
• Conclusions: brief summary and potential implications 
• Trial registration: If your article reports the results of a health care intervention on 
human participants, it must be registered in an appropriate registry and the 
registration number and date of registration should be in stated in this section. If it 
was not registered prospectively (before enrollment of the first participant), you 
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should include the words 'retrospectively registered'. See our editorial policies for 
more information on trial registration 
Keywords 
Three to ten keywords representing the main content of the article. 
 
Background 
The Background section should explain the background to the study, its aims, a summary of 
the existing literature and why this study was necessary or its contribution to the field. 
 
Methods 
The methods section should include: 
 
• the aim, design and setting of the study 
• the characteristics of participants or description of materials 
• a clear description of all processes, interventions and comparisons. Generic drug 
names should generally be used. When proprietary brands are used in research, 
include the brand names in parentheses 
• the type of statistical analysis used, including a power calculation if appropriate 
Results 
This should include the findings of the study including, if appropriate, results of statistical 
analysis which must be included either in the text or as tables and figures. 
 
Discussion 
This section should discuss the implications of the findings in context of existing research 
and highlight limitations of the study. 
 
Conclusions 
This should state clearly the main conclusions and provide an explanation of the importance 
and relevance of the study reported. 
 
List of abbreviations 
If abbreviations are used in the text they should be defined in the text at first use, and a list 
of abbreviations should be provided. 
 
Declarations 
All manuscripts must contain the following sections under the heading 'Declarations': 
 
• Ethics approval and consent to participate 
• Consent for publication 
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• Availability of data and material 
• Competing interests 
• Funding 
• Authors' contributions 
• Acknowledgements 
• Authors' information (optional) 
Please see below for details on the information to be included in these sections. 
 
If any of the sections are not relevant to your manuscript, please include the heading and 
write 'Not applicable' for that section. 
 
Ethics approval and consent to participate 
Manuscripts reporting studies involving human participants, human data or human tissue 
must: 
 
• include a statement on ethics approval and consent (even where the need for 
approval was waived) 
• include the name of the ethics committee that approved the study and the 
committee’s reference number if appropriate 
Studies involving animals must include a statement on ethics approval. 
See our editorial policies information. 
If your manuscript does not report on or involve the use of any animal or human data or 
tissue, please state “Not applicable” in this section. 
 
Consent for publication 
If your manuscript contains any individual person’s data in any form (including any 
individual details, images or videos), consent for publication must be obtained from that 
person, or in the case of children, their parent or legal guardian. All presentations of case 
reports must have consent for publication. 
 
You can use your institutional consent form or our consent forms if you prefer. You 
should not send the form to us on submission, but we may request to see a copy at any 
stage (including after publication). 
 
See our editorial policies for more information on consent for publication. 
 
If your manuscript does not contain data from any individual person, please state “Not 
applicable” in this section. 
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Availability of data and materials 
All manuscripts must include an ‘Availability of data and materials’ statement. Data 
availability statements should include information on where data supporting the results 
reported in the article can be found including, where applicable, hyperlinks to publicly 
archived datasets analysed or generated during the study. By data we mean the minimal 
dataset that would be necessary to interpret, replicate and build upon the findings reported 
in the article. We recognise it is not always possible to share research data publicly, for 
instance when individual privacy could be compromised, and in such instances data 
availability should still be stated in the manuscript along with any conditions for access. 
 
Data availability statements can take one of the following forms (or a combination of more 
than one if required for multiple datasets): 
 
• The datasets generated and/or analysed during the current study are available in the 
[NAME] repository, [PERSISTENT WEB LINK TO DATASETS] 
• The datasets used and/or analysed during the current study are available from the 
corresponding author on reasonable request. 
• All data generated or analysed during this study are included in this published article 
[and its supplementary information files]. 
• The datasets generated and/or analysed during the current study are not publicly 
available due [REASON WHY DATA ARE NOT PUBLIC] but are available from the 
corresponding author on reasonable request. 
• Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or 
analysed during the current study. 
• The data that support the findings of this study are available from [third party name] 
but restrictions apply to the availability of these data, which were used under license 
for the current study, and so are not publicly available. Data are however available 
from the authors upon reasonable request and with permission of [third party 
name]. 
• Not applicable. If your manuscript does not contain any data, please state 'Not 
applicable' in this section. 
More examples of template data availability statements, which include examples of openly 
available and restricted access datasets, are available here. 
 
BioMed Central also requires that authors cite any publicly available data on which the 
conclusions of the paper rely in the manuscript. Data citations should include a persistent 
identifier (such as a DOI) and should ideally be included in the reference list. Citations of 
datasets, when they appear in the reference list, should include the minimum information 
recommended by DataCite and follow journal style. Dataset identifiers including DOIs should 
be expressed as full URLs. For example: 
 
 
Hao Z, AghaKouchak A, Nakhjiri N, Farahmand A. Global integrated drought monitoring and 
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prediction system (GIDMaPS) data sets. figshare. 
2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.853801 
 
With the corresponding text in the Availability of data and materials statement: 
 
The datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current study are available in the 
[NAME] repository, [PERSISTENT WEB LINK TO DATASETS].[Reference number] 
 
Competing interests 
All financial and non-financial competing interests must be declared in this section. 
 
See our editorial policies for a full explanation of competing interests. If you are unsure 
whether you or any of your co-authors have a competing interest, please contact the 
editorial office. 
 
Please use the authors initials to refer to each authors' competing interests in this section. 
 
If you do not have any competing interests, please state "The authors declare that they have 
no competing interests" in this section. 
 
Funding 
All sources of funding for the research reported should be declared. The role of the funding 
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writing the manuscript should be declared. 
 
Authors' contributions 
The individual contributions of authors to the manuscript should be specified in this section. 
Guidance and criteria for authorship can be found in our editorial policies. 
 
Please use initials to refer to each author's contribution in this section, for example: "FC 
analyzed and interpreted the patient data regarding the hematological disease and the 
transplant. RH performed the histological examination of the kidney and was a major 
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If you do not have anyone to acknowledge, please write "Not applicable" in this section. 
 
Group authorship (for manuscripts involving a collaboration group): if you would like the 
names of the individual members of a collaboration Group to be searchable through their 
individual PubMed records, please ensure that the title of the collaboration Group is 
included on the title page and in the submission system and also include collaborating 
author names as the last paragraph of the “Acknowledgements” section. Please add authors 
in the format First Name, Middle initial(s) (optional), Last Name. You can add institution or 
country information for each author if you wish, but this should be consistent across all 
authors. 
 
Please note that individual names may not be present in the PubMed record at the time a 
published article is initially included in PubMed as it takes PubMed additional time to code 
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Authors' information 
This section is optional. 
 
You may choose to use this section to include any relevant information about the author(s) 
that may aid the reader's interpretation of the article and understand the standpoint of the 
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PART E: 
POLICY BRIEF 
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Lessons from the implementation of strategic purchasing in Kenya 
 
Provider and purchaser power play crucial roles in implementation of strategic purchasing 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Kenya has made bold declarations aimed at 
achieving UHC (Universal Health Coverage) by the 
year 2022 as part of a four-pronged approach for 
economic development dubbed as the ‘BIG FOUR’ 
(Government of Kenya, 2018). Kenya, like other 
countries striving to achieve UHC, cannot achieve 
this goal without efforts to promote efficiency from 
the limited resources available for health (Kutzin, 
2001). 
A good starting point for such efforts is making 
deliberate efforts to shift from passive to strategic 
purchasing of healthcare services. 
Purchasing is defined as the 
allocation of pooled funds to 
providers in exchange for medical 
services on behalf of a population 
and can be passive (whereby 
purchasers simply pay bills 
presented by providers) or 
strategic (where purchasers 
continuously apply evidenced based decisions and 
processes aimed at achieving set goals and 
outcomes) (Honda, 2014). When implemented 
correctly, strategic purchasing can allow policy 
makers to align utilization of health budgets to the 
needs of citizens. 
This study explored efforts to implement strategic 
purchasing mechanisms (shown in Figure 1 and 2) in 
private provider facilities by (1) the public 
purchaser- the National Health Insurance Fund 
(NHIF) and (2) private purchasers in Kenya. 
Figure 1 Example of strategic purchasing (use of capitation) 
introduced in Kenya by the Public Purchaser (NHIF) in 2015 to 
roll out outpatient care for all beneficiaries countrywide 
This policy brief was prepared by Dr. Benson Chuma as part of a dissertation for a Master of Public Health degree 
at the School of Public Health & Family Medicine of the University of Cape Town. 
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Figure 2 Examples of strategic purchasing mechanisms 
introduced in Kenya by private purchasers over the last ten years 
amongst private providers 
 
 
introduction of strategic 
purchasing introduces new 
power balances and 
“responses might be 
positive or negative 
depending on whether 
providers see the 
introduction of strategic 
purchasing as an 
opportunity or a 
 
Implementation of strategic purchasing 
mechanisms is however not a straight forward 
process and may run into contestation between 
purchasers and providers as purchasers try and shift 
the risk of providing care to providers as well as try 
and mitigate the effects of information asymmetry. 
Providers may find the strategic purchasing 
mechanism unacceptable1 and resist adoption2 in 
several ways. Busse et al. (2007) note that the 
threat”(Busse et al., 2007). Power is a relational 
concept and exists between two parties. 
 
Purchasers and providers have access to a variety of 
sources of power depending on the market 
structure and may use these sources of power (see 
figures 3 and 4 below) to either enable or disable 
the implementation of strategic purchasing 
mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Acceptability can be defined as the perceptions among 
private providers of the strategic purchasing 
mechanisms and the extent to which these mechanisms 
are agreeable to them 
 
2 Adoption is defined as the intentions, initial decisions, 
and actions of private providers towards 
implementation of strategic purchasing mechanisms 
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The knowledge base on strategic purchasing in 
private providers. Private providers in 
Kenya play a significant role in provision 
of care and over 40% of facilities in 
Kenya are privately owned. 
METHODOLOGY 
 
We used a multiple case study approach 
with two cases: 
 
1. implementation of capitation by 
the NHIF in the roll out of outpatient 
medical cover for all beneficiaries in the 
country in private provider facilities 
2. implementation of select strategic 
purchasing mechanisms by private 
purchasers including intervening in 
clinical decision-making processes, use 
of preauthorization, hiring staff with 
medical knowledge and step-down 
procedure. 
Kenya is growing3 but there is certainly scope for 
implementation research. Kenya has in the past 
decade formulated and sought to implement 
several strategic purchasing mechanisms amongst 
 
 
3 Recent research in Kenya is increasingly shedding light 
on processes related to strategic purchasing, resources 
include (Barasa, E., Nguhiu & McIntyre, 2018, Barasa, 
Edwine et al., 2018, Kazungu et al., 2018, Mbau et al., 
 
We used a conceptual framework (figure 5 below) 
based on the theory that as purchasers roll out new 
strategic purchasing mechanisms (as you move 
from left to right of the diagram), the financial risk 
 
2018, McCollum et al., 2018, Munge, Mulupi & Chuma, 
2015, Nyikuri et al., 2015, Obadha et al., 2018, RESYST, 
2019) 
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of providing care continuously shifts from 
purchasers to providers(Figueras, Robinson & 
Jakubowski, 2005, Preker & Langenbrunner, 2005). 
Sources of data included eight in-depth interviews 
with purchasers, providers and industry experts and 
documentary data comprised of provider-purchaser 
contracts, grey literature and reports found on 
relevant Kenyan websites and newspaper articles. 
Figure 5 Conceptual framework showing purchasers use of power to promote implementation of strategic purchasing and providers 
use of power to resist implementation 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
 
Case one: implementation of capitation to roll out 
outpatient care by the NHIF 
 
In the first case, the NHIF used its regulatory 
authority in Kenya (a source of power) to design the 
capitation model which included a capitation rate 
that many large providers found unacceptable, they 
were able to do this despite continued resistance 
from some of the large private providers. However, 
having the regulatory authority to design capitation 
models and set prices does not necessarily equal the 
power to influence the acceptability and adoption 
of capitation on the ground by providers. Some 
providers felt there was minimal dialogue and 
consensus building between providers and the NHIF 
around the model - these providers, through the 
Kenya Association of Private Hospitals, used the 
media to express their dissatisfaction with the NHIF 
model. The NHIF also used the media and 
attempted to counter these claims by illustrating 
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that multiple private providers had decided to 
adopt the model. Ultimately, some of the large 
private providers used their monopoly power and 
bargaining capacity to walk away from the model as 
they still commanded significant market share even 
without the NHIF capitation business. 
 
The NHIF does still however have some monopsony 
power in the market – they were thus able to 
convince some private providers, especially small 
and mid-sized ones, that there would be significant 
economic gains for them from the capitation model 
due to the huge number of beneficiaries that the 
NHIF covered. 
 
To date some providers especially the large ones 
have resisted adoption of the capitation model. 
Some of the private providers that did enrol with 
the capitation model do also complain that the rates 
are too low and that the model lacks proper 
processes for them to provide feedback on their 
experiences (Obadha et al., 2018, Sieverding, 
Onyango & Suchman, 2018). 
 
The capitation rate as well as the process of 
stakeholder engagement was found to be 
unacceptable by some of the large providers and 
this ultimately affected the adoption of the 
capitation model. For smaller providers, the 
prospects of economic gains from the huge NHIF 
beneficiary list did however promote adoption. 
Case two: implementation of various strategic 
purchasing mechanisms by private purchasers 
 
Private purchasers in Kenya are faced with multiple 
challenges such as existence of information 
asymmetry between them and private providers, 
and the use of fee-for-service as the main provider 
payment mechanism. The challenges have led to 
private purchasers implementing the strategic 
purchasing mechanisms shown in Figure 2 as a way 
of controlling costs of care and ensuring quality of 
care. Private purchasers used bargaining authority 
derived from contracts as a source of power to give 
them some authority over providers by embedding 
the strategic purchasing mechanisms within these 
contracts in order to ensure private providers 
adopted these mechanisms. Providers did willingly 
adopt mechanisms they felt had economic benefits 
(it was thus acceptable to them), such as use of 
preauthorization processes which gave them 
assurance that purchasers would pay their claims 
and use of step-down facilities which they felt 
minimized the risk of unpaid claims. 
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Private providers did however show some 
resistance to full adoption of purchaser intervention 
in clinical decision-making, an interviewee indicated 
they resisted by not disclosing all relevant 
information when requested by the purchaser in 
relation to clinical decisions – thus providers used 
information asymmetry as a source of power and 
resistance. In relation to case managers, staff from 
some rural and small private providers often took 
long periods of time to deal with requests for 
information especially during hospital visits thus 
showing resistance to full adoption. 
While these strategic purchasing mechanisms were 
put in place to save cost and improve quality of care, 
the reality exists in our context that some private 
providers in Kenya have monopoly power and 
operate under a fee-for-service payment 
mechanisms – which means that they can still 
dictate prices of services to purchasers leading to 
poor financial performance of the private 
purchasers. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Provider and purchaser power play a role in 
influencing the implementation outcomes of 
strategic purchasing. Purchasers should thus do an 
assessment of these powers and be knowledgeable 
on different sources of power that exist within a 
particular market context so that they can use their 
own power to the fullest as well as anticipate 
providers use of power to resist implementation of 
mechanisms that may erode provider economic 
gains. 
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
➢ Policy makers should assess and understand 
how the market distributes power between 
purchasers and providers. The solution to some 
of the challenges faced in the implementation 
of strategic purchasing mechanism may lie in 
the broader economic and regulatory context 
that allows for private providers to establish 
monopolies. An analysis of the broader 
economic and regulatory context for health is 
recommended. 
➢ The NHIF should continue using its regulatory 
power to design strategic purchasing 
mechanisms, however this should be done in 
consultation with stakeholders, including 
private providers as this may result in the 
design of models that are deemed more 
acceptable. 
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➢ As problems persist with current 
implementation in Kenya, the NHIF should 
create mechanisms for incorporating provider 
feedback for improvement and refinement of 
the current NHIF outpatient capitation model 
➢ While strategic purchasing mechanisms 
implemented by the private purchaser sought 
to reduce information asymmetry it is 
challenging to do this as private providers resist 
through delaying tactics. Private purchasers 
should thus continuously strengthen existing 
strategic purchasing mechanisms in order to 
make them more effective. For example, they 
could review existing fee for service models to 
include some forms of risk shifting to providers 
as well as 
implement strategies and technologies aimed 
at gaining more visibility of provider actions. 
➢ In addition to using contracts to counter 
provider sources of power, private purchasers 
in Kenya should explore other strategies such 
as introduction of innovative provider payment 
methods (e.g. DRGs and capitation) that shift 
the risk of providing care to providers and 
explore ways of reducing their over reliance on 
a few private providers that command a 
monopoly in the market. The latter can be 
achieved by working with small and mid-sized 
private providers in Kenya who seemed more 
open to adopting new strategic purchasing 
mechanisms. 
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